Essays in political economy by Friedrich, Silke, 1980-
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
by
SILKE FRIEDRICH
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Department of Economics
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
June 2010
11
University of Oregon Graduate School
Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by:
Silke Friedrich
Title:
"Essays in Political Economy"
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Economics by:
Christopher Ellis, Co-Chairperson, Economics
Bruce Blonigen, Co-Chairperson, Economics
Glen Waddell, Member, Economics
Michael Dreiling, Outside Member, Sociology
and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate StudieslDean ofthe Graduate
School for the University of Oregon.
June 14,2010
Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon
Libraries.
@June 2010
Silke Friedrich
iii
IV
An Abstract of the Dissertation of
in the Department of Economics
Silke Friedrich for the degree of
to be taken
Doctor of Philosophy
June 2010
Title: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
Approved:
Dr. Christopher J. Ellis, Co-Chair
Approved:
Dr. Bruce A. Blonigen, Co-Chair
The following essays address the impact of special interest groups on economic
decision making processes.
The hypothesis of the first essay is that there exists a dynamic relationship between
politicians and lobby groups. Politicians may choose to support "projects" proposed
to them by lobbies because they yield clear economic benefits. However, governmental
support may continue after these benefits have been exhausted, implying a cost to
society and yielding rents to the lobbies. A theoretical framework is developed to
model the incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with
vthe hypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from
which all economic rents have been extracted, politicians are rationally reelected.
In the second chapter I examine how structural changes in the US steel industry
affect the voting behavior of House Representatives on trade related bills. The
hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC bailed
out the pension plans of major steel firms. Representatives have an incentive to
vote less for protectionist policies, because the bailout makes the steel firms more
competitive. But the Representatives also have an incentive to yield to the demands
of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The data set
underlying this study is a panel including votes on trade related bills over 9 years.
The results obtained using fixed effects techniques support the hypothesis.
In the third chapter, I develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries.
I model a society with two different groups of citizens, who have different preferences
over public goods, to analyze under which political regime the dissolution of these
groups into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions and
civil wars allows me to look at the effects of both forms of political violence. I find
that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to increase the franchise,
the threat of a civil war can induce a country to dissolve peacefully. The model
predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies, whereas oligarchies
are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The following essays address three different important political economy issues.
The first chapter is concerned with the effect of lobby groups on an economy. The
model introduced in this chapter provides an answer to the question why governments
choose to support special interest groups inefficiently long. Anecdotal evidence for
this hypothesis comes from the agricultural and military industries in the US and in
Europe.
The US steel industry is an example of an industry that keeps receiving government
support, in form of trade protection, even though evidence suggests that the existing
protection has not been able to solve the structural problems of the industry. In the
second chapter, the demand for protection ofthe steel industry is analyzed empirically.
Even though a large share of the US steel firms has become more competitive after
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation bailed out the pension plans of major steel
firms during the last decade, it is argued in this paper that this bailout might not
decrease the demand for protection of the industry.
In the third chapter, a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries is developed.
In this model, society consists of two different groups of citizens, who have different
preferences over public goods. This setup is used to analyze under which political
2regime the dissolution of these tribes into separate countries is most likely. The result
of this thrid chapter is that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies
to increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a country to dissolve
peacefully. The model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies,
whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
3CHAPTER II
POLICY PERSISTENCE AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC RENT SEEKING
Introduction
Most economists agree that special interest groups can influence policy and the
allocation of economic resources. 1 But in the strand of the literature that focuses on
the impact of special interest groups on economic well-being there is disagreement
on whether or not these effects are beneficial. Indicative of this conflict are the
contributions of Putnam (1994) and Olson (1982). Analyzing data across Italian
regions, Putnam attributes the more effective governments of the northern regions
largely to their high levels of "civic engagement". He argues that special interest
groups increase solidarity and cooperation, attributes necessary for the resolution of
collective action problems. 2 Olson, on the other hand, expresses the opposite opinion,
and argues that special interest groups may limit growth possibilities. He observes
that they have an incentive to lobby for socially inefficient policies which benefit
lHillman et al (1988) model how foreign and domestic producers can influence the trade related
policy decisions of a political decision maker. Grossman et al. (1994) use a similar framework and
strengthen the role of the voters such that the reelection of a politician depends on both the utility
of the average voter and the amount of campaign contributions.
2 "Civic engagement", according to Putnam, includes all groups that form in a society because
their members share a common interest. This definition includes community level groups (for
example bird watching groups) as well as organizations on a national level (for example trade unions).
4themselves but are costly to society. In either case it is always assumed that the
nature of the special interest groups remains constant over time.
The hypothesis of this paper is that rent seeking opportunities for special interest
groups have elements of both the Putnam and Olson arguments as they evolve over
time. We argue that even if all projects are assumed to start off as being socially
desirable, they will cease to be so at some point in the future. However different
projects become socially undesirable after different intervals of time. It then becomes
possible that a government will support a project longer than is socially desirable.
There are numerous examples of government agencies that have been accused of
supporting certain projects proposed by lobby groups beyond the point at which all
productive rents have been exhausted. A recent example of such a project is the US
F-22 Raptor fighter jet. It was developed in the 1980s to shoot down the latest Soviet
combat planes. Even today, the Raptor is described as technological marvel, and at
over a quarter of a billion Dollars per plane it is the most expensive fighter jet ever
built. As of June 2008, 122 Raptors were in service of the United States Air Force and
another 65 had been ordered. ,3 Hence, as the New York Times put it, "Americans
can now feel reassured that if the Soviet Union ever springs back to life, restarts the
Cold War and designs a new MIG fighter more advanced than anything now in the
skies, the United States Air Force is ready." ,4 Unfortunately, todays foes are very
3Source: Airforce-technology.com, last seen on 11/03/09
4Source: New york Times: http / /query.nytimes.com/gst/ jullpage.html?res
9BODE6D9133DF93AA15753CIA9629C8B63, last seen on 11/03/09
5different from whose the Raptor was designed to fight. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the
US Army is fighting a highly motivated low-tech enemy, who blend in and out of
urban civilian populations or hide in remote mountain areas and caves. The Raptor
is useless in such an environment, and hence, the F-22 has never been used in a war.
In July 2009, the US Senate stopped a bill that would have authorized funds for an
additional seven Raptors. President Obama praised the Senate's decision, saying that
any money spent on the fighter was an "inexcusable waste".5
Another example of a military project that was once beneficial but has been
continued too long is the German Leopard 2 tank. This tank was developed during
the Cold War to fight an enemy approaching Germany across the North German
plain. But even the latest version of the Leopard 2 is too big to be useful for breaking
up civil wars such as in the Balkan Mountains. In fact, the Bundeswehr does not
even have a cargo plane large enough to transport the Leopard 2. The latest version
has been in active service since 2001. In 2004, the German Bundeswehr still had 1552
battle tanks of the type Leopard 2 waiting for an enemy to attack.,6 In 2008, the
Bundeswehr reduced the number of active Leopard 2's to 400.'7
There is no doubt that the F-22 Raptor and the Leopard 2 were good investments
5Source: New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/business/22defense.html, last
seen on 11/03/09
6Source: Otfried Nassauer for the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, October
30 2004.
7Source: Wikipedia
6- good "projects" - during the Cold War. But support for these projects continued
after their purpose for existence disappeared.
Agricultural subsidies in the US and in Europe provide similar examples. Theodore
Roosevelt introduced farm subsidies in the US in the 1930s in response to a massive
farm depression and the effects of a concurrent drought. These were according
to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace "a temporary solution to deal with an
emergency". In Europe, agricultural subsidies started after WW2 within independent
European nations. The EU took over these national programs in the 1950s and 1960s.
The initial reason for these programs in Europe was to encourage increased food
production. After the EU took over, these programs were continued to ensure that
European countries did not come into conflict over scarce foodstuffs. Today neither
of these reasons hold yet the programs remain in place and prices received by farmers
in the EU and agricultural producer prices in the US are 33% and 15% respectively
above world levels.8 There is evidence that the EU and the US would be better off
without agricultural protection. 9
The examples above suggest that, as in Putnam, special interest groups initially
communicate to a government the existence of opportunities to create productive
rents which initially increase social welfare. However, just as Olson argues, once the
8The base year for these statistics is 2001. For more detail see Tokarick (2003).
9See for example Anderson (1998), Baxter (1992), Tokarick (2005).
7productive rents from an opportunity have been fully extracted the special interest
groups may switch to pure rent-seeking behavior, to the detriment of social welfare.
Whenever the presence of lobby groups leads to Pareto-dominated policies, the
question arises of why voters tolerate such policy choices. The existing literature
has focused only on one side of the answer to this question, on the explanation of
inefficient short term biases in public spending. Coate et al. (1999) model how
special interest groups can "buy" policy decisions from politicians, but the politician
is not then reelected. They suggest that voters prefer forgoing support for policies
that would provide temporary efficiency improvements, if they anticipate that these
policies will persist once they have been implemented. Aidt et al. (2007) find that
growth in government eventually leads to a bias in public expenditure towards short
term projects and argue that this can be explained by a desire on the part of the
electorate to check frequently on the performance of politicians.
But the anecdotal evidence discussed above suggests that there are cases in which
voters tolerate inefficient long-term biases in support for public projects. A main
contribution of our model is that it displays an equilibrium which rationalizes these
observations. Politicians may be rationally reelected even if they pursue policies
that persist "too long" , because if they did not then the quality of the pool of new
projects would deteriorate. This deterioration arrises because of an adverse selection
effect under which the lobbies offering the best projects would choose not to join
the pool if they cannot be assured of future support. The difference between the
8adverse selection effect here and the one developed by Le Breton et al. (2003) is that,
according to the latter, the reason for adverse selection is direct competition between
the lobbies, whereas in the model developed in this paper, adverse selection is caused
by information asymmetries between the lobbies and the government.
The simple model developed in this paper follows the tradition of formal political
economy models; we intend to develop a systematic understanding of complex social
phenomena and abstract from much of the detail. Hence, the model is useful to
explain basic patterns of interaction between political decision makers, lobbies and
voters, but not to literally describe reality.
A Model of Lobbying
The economy consists of an electorate, a set of politicians, and a set of lobbying
firms. In each period the electorate must choose a politician to act as the government,
the politician elected must in turn choose which productive projects to pursue from a
set of alternatives offered to them by the lobbying firms. The electorate are infinitely
lived. Each lobbying firm lives for at most two periods, and offers a single potential
project to the government in its first period of life. Politicians may hold office for a
maximum of two periods. In every period there are potentially present in the economy
"old" lobbies, (0), in the second period of their lives, and "young" lobbies, (Y), in
their first. Hence the life of a lobby may coincide with the period in office of a single
politician or overlap the terms of two.
9There are two different types of lobby groups in the economy: low, (L), and high,
(H), which occur in the proportions C\' and 1 - C\' respectively. High type lobbies
promote projects that are socially productive for two periods. Low type lobbies
promote projects that are only socially productive for a single period. It is therefore
natural to assume that the fixed up-front costs of a project are higher for high types.
This might be due to something as simple as the buildings and plant required to
continue production of a product for several years need to more durable, longer-lived,
and therefore more costly that those required only to last for a short time span. ,ID
Following Besley (2006) there are two types of politicians who may form the
government; good, (G), and bad, (B), who occur in the population of potential
politicians with frequencies 1f and 1 - 1f respectively. ,11 Good politicians act in
the interests of voters. Bad politicians maximize their own private rents. The
electorate choose a politician to select projects on their behalf. In periods in which
the incumbent is ineligible for reelection this takes the form of selecting a random
replacement from the pool of potential candidates. In periods where the incumbent
is eligible for reelection the selection is determined by majority voting.
There is a pool of potential lobbies in the polity. In each period, every potential
lORelaxing this assumption would not change the equilibrium of the baseline model. But it would
alter the results of the extension to the baseline model: even good governments would be more likely
to support low type lobbies inefficiently long, and there would not be an adverse selection effect.
11 For a positive theory of public expenditure, a benevolent politician is, as Aidt et al. (2007) puts
it , "a myth" . But if some politicians are marginally "better" than others (in a sense that they are
more idealistic or more altruistic than others) then the notation of good and bad politicians suffices
to model such differences.
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lobby must decide whether or not to become active and join the pool of lobbies from
which the government selects it's projects.
Timing and Information Structure
The timing of the agents' decisions is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In any period the
sequence of events is as follows: First lobbies of either type must choose whether
to join the pool from which projects are selected. Next the electorate choose the
politician to run the government for that period. If an incumbent is eligible for
reelection the electorate base their voting decisions on observations of the politician's
previous choices and the payoffs they, the electorate, enjoyed. If the incumbent
is ineligible the politician is selected by random draw. The selected politician then
simultaneously draws a potential project to realize from the pool promoted by the
lobbies, and whether or not to continue supporting any previously selected projects.'12
The politician knows the type of the old project but only learns the type of
the new project after it is selected. The projects, potentially both new and old, are
realized and the electorate receive their payoffs. The game repeats in the next period.
For simplicity we shall subsequently assume that the politician selects at most one
12There is a large body of literature that deals with competition between lobby groups and the
process of how governments choose one lobby group over another. Following Potters et al. (1992)
it is assumed that the informational value of a lobby's signal to the government about its type
is not the content of the message sent but the resources spent on sending the message. Since all
lobbies have the same amount of initial resources in this model, they cannot signal their type to the
government.
DECISION MAKER DECISIONS PAYOFFS
11
Lobbies
Politician
Voters
Old"
Young
join?
join?
reelect? >I'
project Y?
project 0'1
---11----1-----------+-----••
time
t+1
, If the politician is eligible for reelection.
** At any time t l old lobbies are only decision makers if they were active in t-l
Figure 2.1. Timing
new project per period, that all agents discount the future using the common discount
factor (3 < 1, and are risk neutral.
Payoffs
Politicians
Politicians of both types receive a combination wage and ego rent from holding
office denoted E. Bad politicians may also in principle receive side-payments of R
from any lobbies they support in a period. Good politicians also care about the net
social benefits enjoyed by the electorate X. Hence
{
E+R
P(j) =
E+X
if the politician is bad
if the politician is good
(11.1 )
where j = G, B is used to indicate the politicians type.
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Lobbies
Lobbies may be young or old and of high or low type (their members are also
assumed to be voters and to receive any payments given to voters). All lobby types
supported by the government receive a per-period subsidy of k. The lobbies costs
depend upon their type and are denoted as where sE{L, H}. The payoffs to the
lobbies depend on the type of politician (G,B) they face. The incremental payoffs to
a young lobby in the first period if the politician is good may be written
P(Y, G, s, e) =
k - as > 0 s = L ey = 1
k - as < 0 s = H ey = 1 (11.2)
e=O
Where e is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the lobby receives government
support and 0 otherwise. Hence, only if the incumbent politician chooses to realize a
young lobby's project (ey = 1), will the lobby receive support. The first-period payoff
from lobbying is positive if the lobby is a low type and is negative if the lobby is a
high type, reflecting the high types greater up-front fixed costs. This implies that a
high type lobby will not join the pool if it cannot obtain support in its second period.
The incremental payoffs to a young lobby in the first period if the politician is
bad may be written
13
k - as - R = 0 s = L ey = 1
P(Y, B, s, e) = k - as < 0 s = H ey = 1 (II.3)
-as < 0 e = 0
Hence, bad politicians extract maximum private rents from the lobbies, which implies
that the payoff of young, low type lobbies is zero if a bad politician is in office. ,13
If a good politician is in office, the incremental payoff for an old lobby ° at time
t is written
k eo = 1
P(O, G, e) = (II.4)
o eo = 0
where k is interpreted as before.
If a bad politician is in office, the incremental payoff for an old lobby °at time t
is written
k - R = 0 eo = 1
P(O,B,e) = (II.5)
o eo = 0
where R is again a private side-payment from the lobby to the politician.
13It is assumed that bad politicians cannot make the lobbies borrow against future earnings.
14
Electorate
The electorate receive a per-person net social benefit of x from all projects that
are socially productive. This includes the projects adopted from all young lobbies
plus the projects of any remaining old high type lobbies. Should the government
support an old low type lobby this yields a net social cost to the electorate. ,14
Hence, in every period, the voters receive a payoff of
(II.6)
where
x(ey)
> 0 ey = 1
=0
(II.7)
and no identifier is required for the payoffs received by the electorate from young
types, also
> 0 eo = 1 So = H
xs(eo) < 0 eo = 1 So = L
= 0 eo = 0
(U.S)
This simply spells out that only high type projects are socially productive in their
second period of life.
Equilibrium
14All projects are financed through taxes. Hence, the payoffs voters receive are the benefits from
the projects minus the tax imposed to finance them.
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The equilibrium consists of a strategy for each player defined on the appropriate
action space, plus beliefs for each player that are updated appropriately using Bayes
rule such that the conditions for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium are satisfied. In each
period nature moves first and selects which potential lobbies are low and high types
with probabilities 0' and 1 - 0', these probabilities are known to all the players but
only the potential lobbies know their own type. Each type of lobby has a plan that
involves first whether or not to enter the initial pool from which the politician makes
a selection, and then if selected whether to lobby for one or two periods. As with
lobbies nature moves first in the selection of a politician's type, choosing good and
bad types with probabilities 7f and 1 - 7f respectively. Again these probabilities are
known to all the players, but only the politicians observe their own type. Politicians
of either type formulate a plan involving, randomly choosing a new young lobby from
the pool, then whether or not to support lobbies of either type in either period and
whether or not to demand any side -payments. The electorate know the values of
7f and 0' and update their beliefs appropriately after observing their own per-period
payoffs. In periods where an incumbent politician is eligible they choose whether or
not to reelect them. In periods when an incumbent is not eligible for reelection they
select a new politician randomly from the pool.
Given that politicians cannot be reelected after their second period in office, the
agents' optimal strategies can be found by using backward induction.'15
15Having term limits does affect policy choices, as empirically shown by Besley et al. (1995). In
this model, the absence of term limits would exclude the possibility of lame duck politicians. This
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Suppose that the incumbent is a good type, by definition they do not demand
side payments and do not support old low type lobbies as this reduces the net social
benefits enjoyed by the electorate. ,16 They do support all young lobbies and high
types in the second period of the types life. Alternatively, suppose the incumbent
is a bad type, in their second period in office they demand side-payments in return
for supporting either high or low type lobbies. In the first period a bad politician
is in office they choose between mimicking the good type, which we will refer to as
"pooling" behavior, or separating from the good type. If they choose to pool, for
purposes of reelection and the consequent future payments, they must support only
old high types. If they separate they support both old high and low types, are
revealed to be bad and are not reelected.
Bad politicians extract the maximal private rent from the lobbies. Hence, when
they demand side-payments, they require R(B, i,j) from each active lobby, depending
both on whether the lobby is young or old (i = {Y, O}) and on whether it is a high
type or a low type (j = {H, L} ). The side-payments from low type lobbies are
written
k - aL if i = Y
R(B,i,L) = (11.9)
k if i = 0
would be welfare improving in this framework since bad politicians would be more likely to pool
with good types.
16This results from the active lobbies being part of the electorate, as described above.
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And the side payments bad politicians receive from high type lobbies are
o if i = Y
R(B, i, H) = (11.10)
2k - aN if i = 0
We may now characterize when bad politicians engage in pooling or separating
behavior in their first periods in office by comparing the appropriate expected payoffs.
Recalling that both good and bad politicians support old high type lobbies and hence
pooling is automatic, we need only to give conditions for pooling and separating when
the old lobby is a low type, viz.
Proposition 1. (1) If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is
a high type, then a bad politician chooses to pool if E 2: ~ - (2k - aN) - a(k - aL)
(2) If both the young and the old lobby in period 1 are low types, then a bad politician
(1-a(3) (1 -(3)pools if E 2: {3 (k - aL) + k -{3- .
The proof of this and all subsequent propositions may be found in the appendix.
These pooling conditions imply that the probability that a bad politician pools in
period 1 increases in the politician's ego rent E. This follows because pooling ensures
reelection and the receipt of the second period ego rent. Bad politicians are also more
likely to pool if they are more patient, i.e., when the discount factor {3 is high, simply
because they then place a higher value on the second period payoffs associated with
reelection. A high a, Le., a large share of low type lobbies in the pool of potential
18
lobbies also increases the probability that a bad politician pools, because a high share
of low type lobbies increases the expected payoff to the politician in the second period.
The pooling condition in the case that the young lobby is a low type is more
restrictive if k - aL + (3(k - aH) > 0, i.e., if the payoff a low type lobby receives in its
first period is larger than the discounted loss of a high type lobby in its first period.
Both low and high type lobbies always join the pool of lobbies. Low type lobbies
are able to cover their costs in the first period and high type lobbies know that any
type of politician keeps supporting them in their second period.
Proposition 2. Pooling is socially desirable.
This follows immediately from noting that a side payment is just a transfer from
one agent to another as is financial support from a government to a lobby of any type.
Hence the social desirability of pooling hinges on the spillovers generated by lobbies.
If there is an old low type and young high type then with separating behavior old low
type lobbies are supported by bad politicians giving negative spillovers, with pooling
these are avoided. When there is an old low type and young low type then there will
be negative spillovers in the current period under separating behavior and potentially
negative spillovers in the next period if a new bad type politician replaces the current
bad one. Under pooling behavior there will only be negative externalities in the next
period, hence both discounting and the possibility of electing a new bad politician
make this socially superior.
19
The equilibrium strategies can be summarized as follows. Bad politicians pool
with good ones if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. This tends to occur if the
discount factor (3 and the share of low type lobbies a are high. Bad politicians are
reelected in this case. If bad politicians choose to separate from good ones, they
reveal their types and as a consequence, they are not reelected. But if there are
no reelection concerns, which is the case in a politician's second period, then bad
politicians support old low type lobbies if they picked a low type from the pool in
period 1. The politicians' actions only differ with respect to their decision to continue
old projects. All politicians choose to support young lobbies in equilibrium and both
types of lobbies join the pool.
The model provides two explanations for the problem initially discussed, that is
lobbies that are no longer socially desirable continue to receive government support.
First, old low type lobbies may receive support from lame-duck politicians in return
for side-payments. Second, young bad-type politicians may choose to separate from
good-type ones so as to receive side payments from current old low type lobbies.
Applying this model to the decision of the US government to continue funding the F-
22 Raptor would suggest that President Obama's statement that continued funding
was an "inexcusable waste" indicates that the Raptor had been funded by a lame
duck politician before.
But this model is too simplistic to explore such issues as which lobbies choose to
20
enter the pool of potential lobbies, and what allows bad-type politicians to engage
in socially undesirable support for lobbies in successive periods yet remain in office.
Agricultural subsidies, for example, have been in place for decades. The baseline
model cannot explain why good governments would rationally subsidize the agriculture
industry, knowing that the country as a whole would be better off without these
subsidies, and yet, the voters accept their choice and reelect them. ,17 This last
question is of particular interest with respect to term limit effects. The behavior
of a lame duck politician is driven by term limits. In the next section we explain
situations in which politicians engage in undesirable support for lobbies and yet are
reelected, a result that is independent of term limits.
To investigate these issues we next reduce the information available to politicians,
specifically we assume a lobby's type is no longer directly observable by a politician.
This allows both good and bad politicians to potentially support old low type lobbies.
But this implies that the electorate cannot perfectly deduce a politicians type from
observing payoffs, potentially allowing bad types that support old low type lobbies
to gain reelection.
The Model with Unobservable Lobby Types
In the baseline specification above it was assumed that a politician knows a lobby's
type as soon as the latter is picked from the pool of potential lobbies. In the following
17See for example Anderson (1998), Baxter (1992), Tokarick (2005)
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extension we consider the case in which the lobbies' types are no longer observable by
the politician. This is important because in reality it is often difficult for governments
to foresee the exact impact a project has on voter welfare. Agricultural subsidies are
an example where it is questionable whether the national governments exactly know
at what point continued support ceased to be beneficial. It is also not straight forward
to determine how long military projects are beneficial, given that the relationship of
a country to potential enemies does not change discretely. Hence, in the following,
we modify the model above by assuming that politicians cannot distinguish between
high and low type lobbies until after the projects are completed.
Equilibrium
As in the baseline specification, the agents' optimal strategies can be found by
using backward induction. Good politicians support all young lobbies, and they
would like to support old high types but not old low types. Since they cannot
distinguish between the lobby types, politicians support old lobbies as long as long
as this maximizes expected voter welfare. The necessary condition for supporting old
and young lobbies is given by Proposition 3.
1
Proposition 3. Good politicians support both lobby types as long as (} ::; "2'
This condition implies that good politicians will support all old lobbies if there
are at least as many high type lobbies as low type lobbies in the pool of potential
lobbies.
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Alternatively, suppose the incumbent is a bad type, in their second period in office
they demand side-payments in return for supporting either high or low type lobbies.
In the first period a bad politician is in office they choose between pooling with or
1
separating from the good types. Pooling is automatic if a ~ 2' i.e., if good politicians
1
support both types of lobbies. If a > 2' bad politicians can choose to pool and only
support young lobbies for purposes of reelection and the consequent future payments.
If they separate and support both young and old lobbies, they are revealed to be bad
types and are not reelected. Bad politicians engage in pooling behavior in their first
periods in office if the condition in Proposition 4 holds.
Proposition 4. Bad politicians pool with good ones if E ~ (~ - 2) ak+ (~ - 1) (1-
a)(2k - aH) + aaL.
This implies that bad politicians are more likely to pool if the fraction of low type
lobbies in the pool of potential lobbies is small since this implies that the probability
of receiving side payments from old low type lobbies in the politician's first period
is small. Bad politicians are also more likely to pool if they are more patient, i.e.,
when the discount factor (3 is high, simply because they then place a higher value
on the second period payoffs associated with reelection. The effect of the per-period
subsidy k on a bad politician's decision about whether or not to pool with good
types is positive as long as a ~ (1 - (3)2, which implies that a high k makes pooling
more likely if the discount factor is sufficiently high and the share of low types a is
sufficiently small. This again hinges on the politician's valuation of future payoffs.
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Unlike in the baseline model, not all lobbies always join the pool of potential
lobbies. High type lobbies only join if the fraction of high type lobbies is sufficiently
large, more precisely, when Proposition 5 holds.
1
Proposition 5. High type lobbies join the pool as long as a ~ 2:'
This is the case because high type lobbies only join the pool if they are supported
by good politicians. The reason for this is that the expected payoff of high type
lobbies is negative if only bad politicians support them in the lobbies' second period.
If high type lobbies do not join the pool of potential lobbies, then bad politicians pool
if
which implies that pooling is more likely if there are only low type lobbies in the pool.
Comparing the pooling conditions of this extension to the ones of the baseline
model shows that the latter are more restrictive.
Proposition 6. Pooling is more likely if the politician cannot observe the types of
the lobbies than it is in the baseline model.
In the baseline model, the only uncertainty about a bad politician's payoff in
the second period is the type of the new lobby in period 2. In the extension to
this model, politicians have no information about the two lobbies they can choose
to support. This makes separating behavior more risky and therefore pooling more
attractive.
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If politicians cannot observe the types of the lobbies, high type lobbies would like
to change the information structure and signal their type to the government - in which
case they would be supported for sure. Following Potters (1992) it can be assumed
that the informational value of the signal is not the content of the message sent but
the resources spent on sending the message. Since all potential lobbies in the pool
are assumed to have the same amount of resources, low type lobbies are able to signal
the exact same way as high types. This implies that high types cannot distinguish
themselves from low types by signaling.
As in the baseline model, pooling is socially desirable if politicians cannot observe
the lobbies' type.
Proposition 7. Pooling is socially desirable.
The social desirability of pooling hinges on the expected spillovers generated by
lobbies, just as in the baseline model. Whether bad politicians pool with or separate
from good types, the expected voter payoff is always higher in the baseline model.
The reason for this is that politicians have more information to base their decisions
on in the baseline model.
The equilibrium strategies can be summarized as follows. Bad politicians pool
with good ones if ex 2': ~ and if the condition in Proposition 4 holds, which tends to
occur if the share of low type lobbies is high. Bad politicians are reelected in this case.
If bad politicians choose to separate from good ones, they reveal their types, and as
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a consequence they are not reelected. But 'if there are no reelection concerns, which
is the case in a politician's second period, then bad politicians always support old
lobbies, The politicians' actions only differ with respect to their decisions to continue
old projects. All politicians choose to support young lobbies in equilibrium. Low type
lobbies always join the pool of lobbies, and high types only join if good politicians
support them in their, the lobbies', second period, i.e., if 0' ~ ~.
The model with unobservable lobby types provides the same two explanations for
the problem initially discussed as the baseline model. First, old low type lobbies may
receive support from lame-duck politicians in return for side-payments. Second young
bad-type politicians may choose to separate from good-type ones so as to receive side
payments from current old low type lobbies, In addition, this specification addresses
circumstances under which some lobbies are not willing to enter the pool of potential
lobbies. This specification shows that if a politician cannot clearly observe a lobby's
type, there are circumstances under which even a good politician provides support for
low type lobbies in the second period. This gives bad-type politicians an additional
opportunity to engage in socially undesirable support of lobbies in successive periods
yet remain in office. Hence, if politicians cannot clearly observe a lobby's type, then
there are cases in which voters are willing to accept a long run bias in public policies,
i.e., reelect politicians even if they fear that some projects are supported inefficiently
long.
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Conclusion
The hypothesis of this paper is that a dynamic relationship exists between politicians
and lobbyists. Anecdotal evidence of support for military projects and agricultural
subsidies suggest that, as in Putnam, special interest groups initially exist to communicate
to a government the existence of opportunities to create productive rents. Such
lobbying activities may initially increase social welfare. However, just as Olson argues,
once the productive rents from an opportunity have been fully extracted the special
interest groups may switch to pure rent-seeking behavior, to the detriment of social
welfare.
A theoretical framework is developed in which established ("old") and new ("young")
lobbies overlap. There are two different types of lobby groups in the economy: low,
and high. High type lobbies promote projects that are socially productive for two
periods, and low type lobbies promote projects that are only socially productive for
a single period.
A baseline specification provides two answers to the question; "why do politicians
choose to support lobbies for an inefficiently long period of time?". First, lobbies
whose social benefits have been exhausted (old low type lobbies) may receive support
in a pooling equilibrium from lame-duck politicians in return for side-payments. Since
bad politicians maximize private rents and not welfare, and have an incentive to
support such lobbies for as long as possible. Second, bad-type politicians may choose
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to separate from good-type ones (welfare-maximizers) so as to receive side payments
from current old low type lobbies. Bad politicians are not reelected if they engage in
separating behavior.
In an extension to the model, politicians are not able to observe the types of the
lobbies seeking support. This specification describes circumstances under which some
lobbies are not willing to enter the pool of potential lobbies. This is the case if the
lobbies cannot be assured of future support. Also, there are circumstances under
which even a good politician chooses to support low type lobbies inefficiently long
and is reelected anyways, because if they did not then the quality of the pool of new
projects would deteriorate.
In the equilibria of both the baseline model and its extension, pooling is socially
desirable, because it implies that bad politicians behave the same way as good ones.
Pooling is also more likely if the discount factor is high, because the more patient
politicians are, the more important is their expected future income for their decisions
today, and the more likely they are to forego short term rents for future payoffs.
Hence, the more patient bad politicians are, the more likely it is that they make
choices that are alined with the voters' preferences. The two model specifications
differ according to the level of transparency. In the baseline model, the government
has enough information to make choices that are aligned with the voters' preferences.
Hence, voters can punish the government if it does not behave according to their
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preferences. If the government does not know the type of the lobbies, and this is
known by the voters, then the latter accept a long term bias in public spending. ,18
The model developed in this paper is not intended to describe a real world situation
but to give a theoretic explanation why governments support lobbies beyond the
point at which all productive rents have been extracted - and are still rationally
reelected. The reasons why lobbies are supported inefficiently long can explain why
some industries such as the agricultural and the defense industry have been able to
receive continued support from US- and European governments in the last decades,
even though it has been questionable whether continued funding is beneficial for a
country as a whole.
I8If the voters do not observe their payoff until after they have to choose whether or not to reelect
the government, then the equilibrium suggests that the voters only reelect the government if it
supports young lobbies. Hence, they accept a short term bias of public spending, which is similar
to what Coate et al. (1999) find.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF THE PBGC BAILOUT ON VOTING FOR TRADE
PROTECTION - EVIDENCE FROM THE US STEEL INDUSTRY
Introduction
The US steel industry has undergone major changes in the last 50 years. Worldwide
competition in the steel market has been increasing since the 1970s, but, unlike Europe
and Japan, a large part of the US steel industry was slow to adapt newly available
technologies. l In order to enable the industry to catch up, various protection measures
have been put in place, and as a result, the steel industry has become one of the most
protected industries in the US. But there is evidence that protection has not had the
intended effect of allowing the industry to solve its structural problems. 2
As a result, many steel firms have declared bankruptcy or have come close to
bankruptcy during the last decade. To mitigate the social consequences for the
affected steel workers, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) bought
out pension plans from a large share of those steel plants that faced bankruptcy. The
consequences of the PBGC intervention are very different for the firms and the steel
lSee Warren (2002), page 258, for a description of the developments in the US steel industry.
2See Blonigen (2006), Brainard et al. (1997), Schuler (1996), Lenway et al. (1996).
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workers. The bailouts drastically reduce the fixed costs of the steel firms, because
the pension payments are a large share of the firms' labor costs. Bethlehem Steel,
one of the largest steel firms in the US, for example, had one active employee for
every 13 retirees in 2002. 3 Hence, the steel firms become more competitive after their
pension plans are bailed out. 4 In the following, the effect of the PBGC bailout on
the steel firms is referred to as the "firm effect". The retired steel workers affected by
the bailout, on the other hand, are made worse off by the PBGC intervention. Even
though they continue to receive the "base rate" of their pensions, they lose at least
their health benefits. If the pension plans were underfunded before the bailout, then
the PBGC covers the difference only partially.5 The practice of underfunding pension
plans is very prevalent. Bethlehem steel, for example, had only funds for 45% of the
pension payments at the time of the bailout. The effect of the PBGC intervention on
the affected steel workers is referred to as the "worker effect" in the following analysis.
The question underlying this paper is how the PBGC intervention in the US steel
industry affects the demand for trade protection of the industry. We approach the
3Source: http://globalag.igc.org/pension/us/private/steelworker.htm, (last seen on
11/23/08).
4See Daniel Ikenson, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies (Cato
Institute), on the structural changes in the US steel industry after the PBGC intervention:
"The New Iron Age: Steel's Renaissance Beckons New Trade Policies", Cato Institute, http :
/ /www.freetrade.org/node/545 (last seen on 04/11/09).
5pBGC statement on the Pension plan of Bethlehem steel: http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-
archive/news-releases/2002/pr03-09.html (last seen on 04/12/10).
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question by analyzing the votes of House Representatives on trade related bills over
nine years. 6
The hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC
bailout. On the one hand, they have an incentive to vote less for protectionist policies,
because the PBGC interventions make the steel firms more competitive. The reason
is the following. If a firm considers lobbying as a substitute for costly adjustment,
as suggested by Bhagwati (1982) and Brainard et al. (1997), then the intervention
of the PBGC decreases the price of structural adjustments relative to lobbying. This
implies that a steel firm has an incentive to lobby less, which in turn makes it more
likely that a Representative votes for free trade.
On the other hand, the Representatives have an incentive to yield to the demand
of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The worsened
situation of the retired steel workers, and the decreased pension security of active
steel workers signal that the situation of the industry worsened and therefore needs
more trade protection. Furthermore, most retired steel workers still own houses and
live in the same communities, and hence, even though their retirement depends less
on the industry after the bailout, the value of their assets still depends on the steel
industry.7 If a Representative's constituency consists of voters who are negatively
6r use the votes of House Representatives and not Senators because the votes of House
Representatives are assumed to be closer proxies to voter preferences than the votes of senators.
See Levitt (1996).
7See Scheve and Slaughter (2001) for a more detailed explanation of this relationship.
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affected by the PBGC intervention, then they have an incentive to vote for more
protectionist policies after the bailout.
Theory predicts that House Representatives voted in favor of protectionist policies
before the PBGC intervened if there is a lot of steel industry in their district, because
steel is a relatively less competitive industry. The question is whether and how the
votes of House Representatives reflect the changes in the industry after the PBGC
intervened. The results obtained using conditionallogit techniques suggest that both,
the "firm effect" and the "worker effect" exist for minimills.
In the following, we give an overview of purpose of the PBGC and its intervention
in the steel industry, then we discuss literature related to this study. We introduce
a theoretic framework underlying the empirical approach. Then the data employed
and the empirical specifications are described and the results are presented. We end
with a concluding section.
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC)
The PBGC was founded in 1974. The main purpose for the participating firms
and their employees is to ensure the uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to
participants and beneficiaries if bankruptcy occurs. Thus, the PBGC is a insurance
for workers: Private firms pay fees and, in case of bankruptcy, the PBGC secures the
(base rate of the) pension payments of the employees. The agency receives no funds
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from general tax revenues. Operations are financed by insurance premiums paid by
companies that sponsor pension plans and by the PBGC's investment returns.
In 1985, more than 112,000 American firms participated in the this system. Since
then, the number of participants has plummeted to 30,000 in 2006.8 The decrease in
members is a result of the incentives of this system, which creates an adverse selection
problem with healthy firms leaving the system. In particular, the PBGC has rules in
place to avoid participating companies underfunding their pension plans. But these
rules are not strict, and there are multiple exceptions to them. Firms in financial
"distress" , for example, may defund their pension plans and, yet, are still eligible for
all benefits in case of a bankruptcy. Ippolito (1989) points to the prevalence of the
practice of underfunding pension plans. He finds that the practice is widespread and
has been around for a long time. 9
Many steel companies have been able to take advantage of the structural problems
of the PBGC. The steel firms have had an incentive to devalue their pension plans
and count on the PBGC when their situation worsened. This has become increasingly
attractive after the decrease in active employees (through the decline of the whole
sector) relatively increased the weight of the fixed cost of pension payments to retired
8Source: "Basics of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)" Employee Benefit
Research Institute", January 2007. (http://www.ebri.org/pdj /publications/ jacts/0705jact.pdj,
last seen on 02/02/09) and "Online extra:Q&A with the PBGC's Bradley Belt - the new executive
director talks about the major reforms that need to be made to ensure the health of pension
payments" (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/042 9/b3892020m zOOl.htm. last
seen on 02/02/09)
9See Note Ai for a note about the observation of the ongoing underfunding - from 1977.
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workers. Being able to exploit the loopholes of the PBGC, some steel firms were
able to get the PBGC benefits before bankruptcy occurred. In this case they could
drastically reduce their fixed costs.
The retired steel workers affected by PBGC bailouts, on the other hand, are made
worse off. Even though they continue to receive the "base rate" of their pensions,
they lost at least their health benefits. If the pension plans are underfunded before
a bailout, as it has often been the case, then the PBGC covered the difference only
partially.
The focus of this study is to look at the impact the PBGC intervention on the
voting behavior of political Representatives. The structural problems of the PBGC
and the strategic decisions of steel firms to devalue their pension plans are not further
addressed, because the steel firms did not leave the cover of the PBGC and the PBGC
is still able to insure pension plans in case bankruptcy occurs.
Related Literature
Trade between countries creates the potential for gains for all countries involved.
But trade liberalization also has distributional consequences within any given country.
In particular, less competitive sectors are likely to oppose free trade. The US steel
industry has long sought and received trade protection, despite ample evidence that
the existing trade protection has not been able to reverse the general downward trend
the industry has been struggling with for the last 50 years.
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Beamer et al. (2003) provide an explanation why the largest steel plants have
become dependent on protection in the first place. They investigate how the relationship
between the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and steel-manufacturing firms
shaped the political economy of the Rust Belt. The authors argue that institutional
commitments (in form of rigid labor contracts) shaped deindustrialization in this area.
According to their study, pensions and severance benefits motivated firm managers to
sustain large, antiquated steel plants and close smaller and more efficient plants, which
has made the industry less competitive and therefore dependent on trade protection.
The authors see the steel firms' legacy payments as a main reason for the downturn
of the industry. This strengthens the hypothesis of this paper that the demand for
protection of the steel firms should decrease after the PBGC bailed out the pension
plans.
Brainard et al. (1997) develop a model that rationalizes the persistence of protectionist
policies. The authors argue that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an
alternative to costly adjustment. With endogenous protection, the level of tariffs is
an increasing function of past tariff's: the more an industry lobbies, the greater the
current protection it receives, and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is
to lobby in the future. Schuler (1996) supports this reasoning by providing empirical
evidence from the US steel industry. According to him, the largest firms have been
the ones that have dominated the politics. The author also argues that the underlying
reason for lobbying for protection was to postpone downsizing costs. Lenway et al.
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(1996) even go a step further and argue that trade protection of the US steel industry
rewards poor performance and reduces incentives to innovate. Morck et al. (2001)
distinguish between habitual and occasional lobbyers and find that the steel industry's
lobbying efforts for import protection are habit forming. Based on the argument that
the lobbying activity of larger steel firms depends on past lobbying, Morck et al.
conclude that granting protection for the steel industry leads to dependency of the
industry on protection.
The previous studies suggest that the lobbying efforts of the steel firms explain
the high levels of protection of the industry. In this paper, we argue that the PBGC
intervention is another factor that increases the level of protection in the industry.
While there are explanations for the existence and the persistence of protectionist
policies, there is justified doubt about the effectiveness of US steel protection. Blonigen
et al. (2006), for example, investigate the effect of VRAs and antidumping duties on
the US steel industry. They find that protection efforts were successful in restricting
import levels, but that the effect on long-run trends in the US steel industry were
small. The reason for this is that unfair import competition is only one amongst other
problems of the industry, including combination of appropriation of rents by unions,
slow adoption of new technologies, and the changing market conditions.
The recent involvement of the PBGC has drastically changed both incentives of
steel firms (by reducing the fixed cost) and steel workers (by increasing uncertainty
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about pension security). The question is to what extent these changes impact the the
political decision makers' preferences towards free trade.
Given that public and political interests are not perfectly aligned, there is an
opportunity for policy-makers to vote for different interests. Hence, it is important to
distinguish between different incentives a politician might have when one is dealing
with voting data. Grossman et al. (1994) describe political decisions in a way that
incumbent politicians can maximize their own utility, which depends to some extent
on social welfare. Hence, the politicians' decisions depend on how highly they values
private rents compared to social welfare.
Peltzman (1984) empirically examines how much of the variation in legislators'
voting behavior can be explained by "interest" and how much can be explained
by "ideology". He argues that the tendency for legislators to shirk serving their
constituents' interests in favor of their own preferences (ideology) seems more apparent
than real. According to him, ideology measures can explain much legislative voting
behavior statistically. But, they turn out to be proxies for something else: Peltzman
finds that liberals and conservatives tend to appeal to voters with systematically
different incomes, education, and occupations, and to draw contributions from different
interest groups. These systematic differences point to, by and large, different voting
patterns. Peltzman's finding that a legislator's ideology (or personal preference) is not
a real determinant for their voting decision is controversial. Opponents of this view
are Kalt et al. (1984, 1990). Examining votes on one specific issue (cole strip-mining
38
regulations) and not on an entire package of votes as Peltzman does, Kalt et al. show
that Senators' ideologies are important to explain their votes on the issue. Stratman
(2001) also tests the impact of ideology on congressional voting patterns. Controlling
for the possibility that Senators trade votes, his findings confirms Peltzman's results.
Voting for Trade Protection - A Model
Peltzman (1984) develops a model in which a legislator's policy choice can be
explained by "economic interest" of constituents in the outcome. The congressional
voting model introduced in this section is similar to the one Peltzman used to motivate
his empirical approach.
Suppose the legislators' objective is to maximize the expected share of popular
vote or, equivalently, their probability of reelection. Then a legislator's expected vote
share in the next election (M) can be expressed as
M = R(m) +T(l - m) (IIL1)
where m is the share in the last election and Rand T are fractions of those who voted
for or against the legislator, respectively, last time, and who is expected to support
the politician in the next election.
For simplicity suppose that following his election, the legislator votes on a number
of bills which are all trade related. Assume that a "yes" vote on a bill is a vote for
the protectionist policy. Each of these bills either helps or hurts voters according
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to the sector (S) in which they work. Suppose that the people who voted for the
legislator are employed in a sector benefitting from protection (SF), and those who
opposed them are employed in a sector that is hurt by protection (SA)' By choosing
the number of bills to support, the legislator affects both T and R in two ways. First,
there is a direct effect because voters either benefit or suffer from votes for protection
depending on the sector in which they are employed. Second, there is an indirect effect
because the number of bills supported impacts the amount of campaign contributions
a legislator receives. This can be expressed:
(IIl.2)
(IIl.3)
where v is the number of protectionist votes and X are the expected campaign funds.
The first order condition for the problem, choose v to maximize M, is
In general, Tv and Rv will be related to SA and SF, respectively:
Rv = r(SF)
Tv = t(SA)
(IlIA)
(IlL 5)
(IlL 6)
with rSF < 0 and tSA < O. That is, the more competitive the environment of a voter
group, the more who benefit from a pro trade vote, and hence, the less voters who
are likely to reward the legislator in the next election. Furthermore, the number of
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bills supported by the politician positively effects the level of campaign contributions
from former supporters and negatively effects the level of contributions from former
opponents, which can be expressed as
X Rv = g(SF) > 0
X Tv = f(SA) < 0
(III.7)
(IIL8)
Using Bhagwati's (1982) and Brainard's approach and modeling lobbying and structural
adjustments as substitutes, it can be assumed that both of the effects above decrease
as a sector (A or F) becomes more competitive. This implies that the impact of
campaign contributions on a politician's choice of the number of pro trade votes
decreases as s sector becomes more competitive.
The implications of a change in the competitiveness of a sector can be shown with
the following two expressions
(IlL9)
(IlLI0)
Hence, as soon as at least one sector becomes more competitive, the politician chooses
to decrease the number of protectionist votes, because the opponents will now be more
pleased and fewer of the supporters displeased by such votes.
The implication of this model for the effect of the intervention of the PBGC in
the steel industry is the following: A Representative in a district with a lot of steel
industry is likely to vote for protection before the PBGC intervened, because the steel
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industry benefits from protection, and because steel firms have an incentive to lobby
for protection. The PBGC intervention made the steel firms more competitive - and
hence, the steel firms have an incentive to lobby less and hence, the Representative
receives less contributions for protectionist votes. But if the constituency of the
Representative consists of steel workers, who are negatively affected by the bailout,
then they are not under the impression that the steel industry has become more
competitive - on the contrary - and the Representative receives more support by voting
for protectionist policies. Whether the PBGC intervention induces the Representative
to vote for or against more protection depends on which of these two opposing effects
is larger.
The data on trade votes used in this study come from the Congressional Quarterly
Almanacs for the 105th - 109th Congress. The criterion used to characterize votes
relevant for this study is that a vote offered a clear choice of whether to raise or to
lower trade barriers that affect the steel industry. We only use the votes on trade
barriers, since barriers are the predominant form of trade protection that affects
the steel industry,lO The data set includes the votes of House Representatives in
all 435 congressional districts on 13 trade related bills in 9 years. ll The vote of a
lOSee Table 1A: US Steel Trade Protection Events.
llSee Table 2A: Trade related bills Congress voted on between 1998 and 2006.
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Representative in congressional district i in year t on bill j is a binary variable, where
1 indicates that the Representative voted for the free trade position and 0 indicates
they voted against the free trade position. Trade votes are used as the dependent
variable in the empirical specifications. 12
Information on the steel plants whose pension plans were overtaken by the PBGC
comes from the PBGC's press releases. 13 The information from these data is the name
of the steel firm whose pension plan was overtaken and the year when this happened.
Data about all major American steel plants used in this study comes from the
Center for Industry Studies (CIS) at the University of Pittsburgh. This data set
provides information about the number of firms, firm types, ownership and plant
capacities. The main two types of steel mills in the US are minimills, which produce
raw steel by recycling scrap, and integrated steel mills, which produce higher quality
steel ill mostly much higher quantity. Minimills operate more efficiently, but historically
cannot produce as high quality of steel as the integrated mills. Another difference
between these two types is that integrated firms are primarily unionized, whereas
12An issue with voting records is that they cannot be interpreted as a perfect representation of
peoples' attitudes towards free trade, as it is possible with survey data. But, on the other side,
voting records do not suffer from biases resulting from selection or sample size. Previous work that
has empirically examined peoples' attitudes toward trade liberalization using survey data is often
limited to a cross sectional analysis because many surveys were only conducted in one year. Mayda
et al. (2005), for example, use data from the 1995 National Identity Module (ISSP), and Denslow
et al. (1996) use data from the NAFTA telephone survey conducted in 1993. Scheve et al. (2001)
and Blonigen (2008) both base their studies on data from the American National Election Studies
(ANES).
13PBGC press releases for the years 1997-2006: http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/news-
releases/1997/ - http://www.pbgc.gov/media/news-archive/news-releasesj2006/.
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minimills are not. The number of steel plants and their capacities are used in the
regressions as a proxy for the employment in the industry.
Other possible determinants for a Representative's attitude towards free trade are
congressional district characteristics. Such data are available available until 1998 from
Adler. 14 For later years, these data are available from the Census Bureau. We use the
total population and the number of people above 65 to calculate the percentage of
share of retired people in a congressional district. Since steel plants are most often the
major employers in a congressional district, we use the fraction of retired people in a
congressional district as a proxy variable for the ratio of retired to working employees
in the steel industry.
To control for individual specific effects we include the political party affiliation
of the Representatives.
The unit of observation m this data set is by congressional district by year.
Congressional districts change every 10 years. In the time span from 1998-2006,
this happened in 2003. We control for this change by assuming the new districts
are different from the former districts and include 870 instead of 435 congressional
district fixed effects.
See Tables 3.1- 3.3 for an overview of the data employed.
14prof. Scott Adler, University of Colorado.
Website: http II sobek.colorado.edul esadler ICongressionalvistrictvata.html (last seen:
04/ 26/10)
Table 3.1. Data Availability
Source Data content Years available
Congressional Quarterly Almanacs trade votes 1998-2006
PBGC PBGC 1998-2006
CIS capacities 1998-2006
Adler, Census cd specific controls 1998-2006*
* 1993-1998 from Adler, 1999-2006 from Census (2000 values as proxies
for 01, 2003 for 02, and 1998 values as proxies for 1999)
Table 3.2. Variable Description
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Variable
cd
Vote
PBGC
PPD
Total Cap.
Integrated Cap.
Retired
Republican
Description
ID number of congressional districts
accounting for the difference in districts
between 2002-2003 (n: 1-870)
trade votes
# of firms in a district whose pensions
were bought out by the PBGC
# of steel plants in a district
total capacity in short tons
total capacity of integrated steel firms
in short tons
% of population above 65
1 if the Representative is republican
Table 3.3. Summary Statistics
Unit of obs.
by bill by cd
by year
by cd by year
by cd by year
by cd by year
by cd by year
by cd by year
by cd by year
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Vote* 0.555 0.497 0 1 5410
PBGC 0.079 0.354 0 3 5410
Plants per district 0.455 0.974 0 9 5410
Total Capacity** 0.728 3.705 0 69.19 5380
Integrated Capacity** 0.431 3.512 0 68.489 5380
Republican*** 0.526 0.499 0 1 5410
Retired 0.123 0.03 0.041 0.311 5295
Year 2002.862 2.419 1998 2006 5410
*Votes other than "yes" or "no" are excluded.
** In 1000s of short tons.
*** Votes of independent Representatives are excluded.
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Empirical Specification
In the introductory part of this paper, the argument was made that after the
intervention of the PBGC, the steel firms are more competitive ("firm effect"), but the
steel workers are made worse off ("worker effect"). The implication of this, according
to the theoretical model introduced above, is that House Representatives have an
incentive to vote more in favor of free trade after the PBGC intervened because of
the increased competitiveness of the firm(s), but on the other hand, they have an
incentive to vote more for protectionist policies if their constituency sees the PBGC
intervention as a signal that the situation for the steel industry has worsened.
The effect of the PBGC bailout in a congressional district on the voting behavior of
a Representative can be tested empirically by addressing both the effect on the firms
and on the workers. In all the empirical specifications, the dependent variable is Vote,
a binary variable capturing the vote of Representative i on bill j in year t. Vote = 1
if the Representative votes for the free trade position. We capture the firm effect by
controlling for the number of firms in district j in year t whose pension plans were
overtaken by the PBGC (PBGC). The worker effect is measured by interacting PBGC
with the number of retired workers in district i in year t (Retired). Additional controls
are characteristics of a congressional district and characteristics of the supporters of
a Representative, as well as a time trend.
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Hence, the empirical approach is the following
Vijt = /lPBGCit + /2 (PBGC * Retired)it
+ /3 (Plants per district)it + /4Retiredit + ,sRepublicanit + /6Trendit + Cijt
Since the PBGC intervention made the steel firms more competitive, their incentive
to lobby for protection is expected to decrease, which decreases the Representative's
incentive to vote for protectionist policies. Hence, the expected sign of the coefficient
of PBGC is positive. But the steel workers, especially the retired ones, who are
affected by the PBGC bailout are worse off after the bailout, since they lose (at least)
part of their pension payments. This effect is expected to increase the more workers
are affected. This is why the expected sign of the interaction term of PBGC and
Retired is negative.
The number of steel plants per district controls for the prevalence of steel industry
in a district. The more steel industry there is, the more likely it is that a Representative
votes in favor of protectionist policies. Peltzman (1984) finds that controlling for a
Senator's party affiliation substantially increases one's information about a Senator's
voting patterns. But if party affiliation is added to a whole list of the Senators'
supporters' characteristics, then little more is gained than by ignoring it. This is
why we include a control for House Representatives' party affiliation in the empirical
specifications as a proxy for the characteristics for the Representatives' supporters'
preferences.
Republican House Representatives (and their supporters) have been shown to
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support free trade more than democratic Representatives (and their supporters),
which is why one would expect the coefficient of Republican to be positive. 15
A time trend is included to control for systematic differences between years.
This is the basic specification, where we address the effect of the numbers of steel
plants and the numbers of bailouts. We use similar specifications where we include
capacities and employment levels (instead of the numbers of firms and bailouts) as
robustness checks.
Empirical Results
Table 3.4 presents the results of the basic specification, as it is explained in the
previous section. 16 Again, the dependent variable is Vote, a binary variable capturing
the vote of Representative i on bill j in year t. Vote = 1 if the Representative votes
for the free trade position. The variables of interest are PBGC and PBGC*Retired,
where the PBGC captures the firm effect by controlling for the number of firms
in district i in year t whose pension plans were overtaken by the PBGC, and the
interaction term of PBGC and the number of retired workers in district i in year t
(Retired) captures the worker efJect. The coefficients of both of these variables are
significant and have the expected sign. This implies that the more firms were bailed
out in a district, the more likely is the Representative to vote in favor of free trade.
15See Peltzman (1994)
16To control for within-group correlation of the error terms, the error terms are clustered by
congressional districts.
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The coefficient of the interaction term has the expected negative sign, implying that
the more workers are affected by the bailout, the less likely a Representative is to
vote for free trade. As expected, a Representative is more likely to vote for free trade
if she is affiliated with the republican party. A time trend is included to control for
systematic differences over time, but this is not reported in the tables. The coefficient
of Retired is insignificant, which indicates that the significance of the interaction term
of Retired and PBGC is not driven by the preference of retired people for or against
protection. The fact that Plants per district is not significant could be due to the fact
that campaign contributions are mostly paid at the firm and not plant level. Hence,
a Representative does not have an incentive to vote for protection if there are many
steel plants in their district if the firms owning these plants are not the ones lobbying
for protection.
The results shown in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 show the differences between the
effect of the PBGC bailout on integrated versus not integrated steel firms. Table 3.5
suggests that the PBGC intervention in integrated firms had no effect on the voting
behavior of Representatives, but that the effect is strong where the PBGC intervened
in other steel plants (i.e., mainly Greenfield and Brownfield Minimills). A possible
explanation for this is that most integrated steel firms are strongly unionized. This
implies that the labor unions fought for pension benefits for the workers of integrated
plants after the PBGC intervened, while the workers of Minimills who are mostly
unorganized suffered the consequences. The unions of integrated firms also lobby
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Table 3.4. Basic Specification: Number of Steel Plants per District
Conditional Logit
PBGC 4.974
(2.77)***
PBGC*Retired -35.584
(3.37)***
Plants per district -0.145
(.058)
Retired 1.433
(0.52)
Republican 3.128
(10.57)***
Observations 3845
Number of CDs 430
Pseudo R 2 0.325
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
strongly for protection, and since they represent the workers, they did not reduce
lobbying expenditure after the PBGC intervention, which explains why there is no
firm effect in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5. Number of Integrated Plants per District
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PBGC * Integrated plants per district
PBGC * Integrated plants per district * Retired
Integrated plants per district
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
-3.338
(1.14)
19.405
(0.84)
-0.530
(0.55)
0.074
(0.03)
3.050
(10.34)***
3845
430
0.323
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
Table 3.6. Number of Minimills per District
PBGC * Not integrated plants
PBGC * Not integrated plants * Retired
Not integrated plants per district
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
6.257
(3.39)***
-38.051
(3.15)***
-0.157
(0.64)
1.240
(0.45)
3.190
(10.71)***
3845
430
0.326
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
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Table 3.7 to Table 3.9 present the results of similar specifications as in the tables
above, with the difference that the variables D PBGC and D PBGC*D Steel plants
are not the numbers of firms, but dummy variables capturing whether there is steel
industry in a district and whether the PBGC intervened in a district. This captures
the effect of the PBGC intervention without looking at the magnitude of the steel
industry in a district, as a robustness check that supports the hypothesis that a higher
number of steel plants does not necessarily increase a representative's incentive to vote
for free trade. Whether a Representative votes in favor of free trade also depends on
the plants' efficiency as well as on the amount of lobbying activity the firms engage in.
But the results suggest that the results are robust if we only account for the presence
of steel industry in a district.
Table 3.7. Districts with Steel Plants
Conditional Logit
D PBGC 7.075
(3.35)***
D PBGC * Retired -47.654
(3.77)***
D plants per district -0.450
(1.44)
Retired 1.568
(0.57)
Republican 3.152
(10.64)***
Observations 3845
Number of CDs 430
Pseudo R 2 0.327
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
Table 3.8. Districts with Minimills
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D PBGC * D Not integrated plants
D PBGC * D Not integrated plants*Retired
D Not integrated plants
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
6.752
(4.35)***
-39.369
(3.93)***
-0.272
(0.91)
1.253
(0.45)
3.200
(10.75)***
3845
430
0.327
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
53
Table 3.9. Districts with Integrated Steel Plants
D PBGC * D Integrated plants per district
D PBGC * D Integrated plants per district *Retired
D Integrated plants
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
-3.547
(1.16)
20.570
(0.87)
-0.564
(0.85)
0.050
(0.02)
3.050
(10.31)***
3845
430
0.323
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
The results shown in Table 3.10 to Table 3.13 show additional robustness checks.
In Table 3.10 to Table 3.12, the variable plants per district is replaced with capacities
of the steel firms. Again, we distinguish between total capacities (Tablel 0) 1 capacities
of integrated steel plants (Table 3.11), and capacities of all other plant types (Table
3.12). For all capacity types, we find no efFect ofthe PBGC bailout on the Representatives'
votes. On the first look, this indicates that the capacities of steel plants are not
correlated with the plants' lobbying activity and that the effect of the bailout on steel
workers does not depend on the capacity of steel produced. But it is the case that
large integrated firms - with high capacities - lobby most. But both the firms and
the powerful unions engage in lobbying activity, which indicates that for integrated
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firms, we do not find a workeT - aT firm effect for the same reason as before: the
unions counteract these effects. But it is plausible that the capacities of minimills are
not correlated with the plants' lobbying activity and that the effect of the bailout on
steel workers of minimills does not depend on the capacity of steel produced, since
the efficiency of minimills varies largely across plants, which is something we cannot
control for with our data.
Table 3.10. Total Capacity of the Steel Plants in a District
PBGC * Total capacity
PBGC * Total capacity * Retired
Total capacity
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R2
Conditional Logit
0.000
(0.43)
-0.003
(0.49)
-0.023
(0.29)
0.426
(0.16)
3.064
(10.33)***
3832
428
0.323
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
Table 3.11. Integrated Capacity of the Steel Plants in a District
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PBGC * Integrated capacity
PBGC * Integrated capacity * Retired
Integrated capacity
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
0,000
(0,74)
0,002
(0,90)
-0.082
(1.23)
-0,051
(0.02)
3.049
(11.14)***
3832
428
0.323
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
Table 3.12. Capacity of the Minimills in a District
PBGC * Capacity of not integrated plants
PBGC * Capacity of not integrated plants * Retired
Capacity of not integrated plants
Retired
Republican
Observations
Number of CDs
Pseudo R 2
Conditional Logit
0.006
(1.19)
-0.0,34
(1.64)
0.074
(0,37)
0.597
(0.22)
3.143
(10.54)***
3832
428
0.324
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses;
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The error terms are clustered by congressional districts
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Other specifications not included in the output tables include the following:
We control for changes in the ownership of the steel firms. If a steel firm is taken
over (especially by a foreign firm), then one would expect lobbying expenditures to
decrease and hence, voting for protection to decrease. We find this in the data but it
does not change the crucial results.
We also check for the robustness of our dependent variable. Different criteria are
used to determine whether a trade related bill is relevant for the steel industry. The
more loose the criteria, the less significant are the results, which is what one would
expect.
Furthermore, we exclude the congressional districts that changed from 2002 to
2003 due to the rearrangement of the congressional districts following the 2000 Census.
But this includes most districts with steel industry, which is why the results become
weaker.
Conclusion
The steel industry has become one of the most protected industries in the US over
the course of the last 50 years. But there is evidence that protection has not had the
intended effect of allowing the industry to solve its structural problems. As a result
of these problems, many steel firms have declared bankruptcy or have come close
to bankruptcy during the last decade, which is why the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) bought out the pension plans from a large share of those steel
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plants. The involvement of the PBGC has drastically changed both incentives of steel
firms ("firm effect") and steel workers ("worker effect"). The question is to what
extent these changes impact the the political decision makers' preferences towards
free trade.
The hypothesis of this paper is that Representatives face opposmg incentives
after the PBGC bailout. On the one hand, they have an incentive to vote less for
protectionist policies, because the PBGC interventions drastically cuts the firms' fixed
cost, which increases the firms' relative cost of lobbying for protection. On the other
hand, the steel workers, i.e., the constituency of Representatives in steel districts, are
made worse off by the bailout because they lose part of their pension plans - or the
security of their pension plans, which is an incentive for Representatives to vote for
more protection.
The results obtained using conditional logit techniques suggest that both, "firm
effect" and "worker effect" exist for minimills, but not for integrated steel firms.
We explain this finding with the argument that the integrated steel firms are more
unionized and hence, the unions fight for the employees pension plans and keep
lobbying for protection, counterbalancing the effects of the PBGC intervention. The
minimills on the other hand are often part of major steel firms, and more often affected
by the PBGC intervention than the integrated firms. But they do not have strong
labor unions, and hence, we see an effect of the PBGC intervention on voting for
trade protection in districts with many minimills.
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This study could be improved by using more data. It would be very interesting
to extend the data set for the years after 2006. Furthermore, to refine the variable
capturing the worker effect, it would be interesting to be able to control for firms that
went bankrupt to distinguish between the worker effect in case the PBGC intervened
and in case this did not happen after a bankruptcy. In order to test whether the high
degree of unionization counteracts the effect of the PBGC intervention in integrated
steel plants, it would be very interesting to have data on unionization in the industry.
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CHAPTER IV
A THEORY OF THE DISSOLUTION OF COUNTRIES
Introduction
A fundamental goal of research concerned with political economy issues is the
determination of the factors that influence the institutions of political decision making.
A natural distinction of such institutions is between democratic and nondemocratic
institutions. Political institutions determine how well the government of a country
represents the interests of its citizens. These interests are different depending on
differences in the citizens' income and their preferences over public goods. The
last 200 years have shown vast changes in the political landscape of most countries.
While consolidated democracies have been established in some countries (US, Western
Europe, Australia, New Zealand), others have remained persistent non-democracies
for a long time (South Africa, Singapore). Transitions of political institutions can be
peaceful (Britain, Czech Republic, Slovakia) or violent (Nicaragua, former Yugoslavia),
sometimes they leave the borders of a country unaffected (Britain, Nicaragua), sometimes
countries partition in the process (Slovakia, Croatia, Eritrea).
The focus of this paper is to determine why some countries stay united while
other dissolve - either through civil war or peaceful partition. In order to examine
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such political transition processes, it is important to understand what drives the
different forms of political violence. We argue that revolutions and civil wars happen
for different reasons and have very different effects on the political structure of a
country.
In the existing economic literature, "civil war" is most often defined as "an armed
conflict which (a) causes more than one thousand deaths (b) challenges sovereignty
of an internationally recognized state (c) occurs within the recognized boundaries of
that state (d) involves the state-claimants as a principal combatant (e) involves rebels
with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state".l According to
this definition of "civil war", there were 127 civil war events in the post World War II
period. We criticize that this definition includes "revolutions" as well as "civil wars" .
The critical difference between these two forms of civic violence is that in a revolution,
one group of citizens (the poor) revolts with the goal to overthrow the government
(the rich), whereas a "civil war" is a conflict between two groups of citizens, with rich
and poor members in each group.
A recent example for a revolution is the social conflict in Nicaragua that peaked
m 1979, when the Somoza dictatorship was overthrown. Social unrest had built
in Nicaragua since the 1960s, mainly because of the extensive practice of nepotism
and corruption in the Somoza regime, in which all political power in Nicaragua was
restricted to family members of the Somosa clan. As a consequence, the demand
lSee Sambanis (2002).
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for the right of political participation started to increase among peasants as well as
among the the middle class, which finally resulted in a bloody coup d'etat. The Frente
Sandinista de Liberacin Nacional (FSLN), who had led the revolution, formed the new
government and extended the political rights of the poor. 2 This is an example of a
conflict between the ruling class and the disenfranchised. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) and Moore (1967) argue such a conflict can induce democratization processes,
because the poor gain political participation after overthrowing the existing regime,
as it was the case in Nicaragua. Acemoglu and Robinson go a step further: Even
the threat of a revolution from the poor can incentivize the elites of a country to
extend political power in order to avoid revolution. They argue that elites have
no interest in redistribution of wealth, but they prefer redistribution to revolution.
If current transfers from the elite to the poor do not ensure future transfers, but
extension of suffrage changes future political equilibria, then democratization acts
as a commitment to redistribution. Thus, political transition might be the only
way to avoid revolution. The authors use Britain and South Africa as examples of
countries that transitioned peacefully from autocratic to democratic regimes, because
the ruling elites strategically extended the franchise to avoid revolution. They argue
that in Britain, the ruling aristocracy started to increase the franchise gradually
beginning in 1832. The concessions made were aimed at incorporating the previously
2Source: http://www,stanjord.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discoverYeng/timeline/ (last seen
on 05/15/10)
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disenfranchised into politics because the alternative was seen to be social unrest, and
possibly revolution. In South Africa, the apartheid regime maintained power through
extensive repression and violence for a long time, until in 1994, the regime was forced
to democratize rather than risk potentially worse alternatives.
While revolutions, and more important - even the threat of revolutions - can
start democratization processes, civil wars have the tendency to induce autocratic
systems. 3 A recent example of civil conflict that falls under the category of conflict we
define as a civil war is the conflict in Ethiopia, which resulted in the independence of
Eritrea from Ethiopia. The initial conflict within Ethiopia had economic causes. The
central government extracted resources from the part that is now Eritrea. Businesses,
for example, were forced out of Eritrea. Both christians and muslims in Eritrea
increasingly opposed the government, which acted primarily according to the interests
of Ethiopia. After 30 years of civil war, Eritrea became independent in 1991. While
Ethiopia became democratic (at least on paper), Eritrea has remained an autocratic
regime. 4 We explain the tendency that civil wars do not encourage the emergence
of democratic systems with the incentives of the elites within the group that seeks
the partition of a country. Civil wars empower these elites and may enable them to
remain in power after the civil war is over. This was the case in Eritrea, where the
3For clarity of their main point, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model revolutions as always
successful once they are started. We adopt this concept and apply the same idea to civil wars, Le.,
model them as always successful once they are started. A "successful civil war" is defined as one in
which the group that starts the war manages to break away from the rest of the country.
4Sources: http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/echo/eritreaI961.htm (last seen on 05/15/10)
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HistorYoiEritrea (last seen on 05/15/10)
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Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) remained in power and changed into a
purely political organization after the civil war was over. 5 Our model predicts that
civil war is more attractive for the elites starting these wars if they gain more in
terms of political power. This is especially the case if the elites can break away from
a democracy and establish an autocracy in a separate country, which is why the model
predicts that civil wars are more likely in democracies. But we show that, especially
in democracies, there is an alternative to civil wars: the peaceful dissolution of the
country. A good example is the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia. The growing
interethnic conflict in the country between the Czechs and the Slovaks was resolved
peacefully when the constituent republic of Czechoslovakia agreed to end the state
and to dissolve in 1992. The question that logically follows is why the breakup of
Yugoslavia, a country with a very similar past and source of conflict, dissolved through
a violent civil war. Our model predicts that the expected gain for Serbia from trying to
keep the country united was large enough not to agree to the independence demands
of the republics, because the conflict in Yugoslavia was not only between two groups
in the country, but between several republics.
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of
countries. In order to address social conflict within a country we model a society with
two different groups of citizens (we call them tribes), who have different preferences
over public goods. This allows us to analyze under which political regime the dissolution
5In 1994, the EPLF changed its name to People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).
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of these tribes into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions
and civil wars enables us to look at the effects of both forms of political violence
separately. vVe find that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to
increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a country to dissolve
peacefully. Our model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies,
whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united. This model explains
why the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia was possible, and explains why most
dissolutions after civil wars happened in countries with low democracy index.6
The simple model developed in this paper follows the tradition of formal political
economy models; we intend to develop a systematic understanding of complex social
phenomena and abstract from much of the detail. Hence, the model is intended
to describe the broad patterns (not the details) of political decision makers' choices
about public goods allocations, taxes, and independence.
Related Literature
Our theoretical framework is based on the static model developed by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006).7 This framework allows us to explain the creation and consolidation
of democracy. In this model, the existing elites start democratization processes,
6Sambanis (2000) states that from 14 countries that dissolved after a civil war since WW2, the
only separation of two countries with a high democracy index (which is measured using Jagger and
Gurrs Polity 98 data) are India and Kashmir.
7Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) explain the dynamic version
of their model in more detail.
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i.e., strategically extend the franchise, to prevent social unrest and revolution. The
elites have no interest in redistribution of wealth, but they prefer redistribution
to revolution. If current transfers from the elite to the poor do not ensure future
transfers, but extension of suffrage changes future political equilibria, then democratization
acts as a commitment to redistribution. Thus, political transition might be the only
way to avoid revolution. 8 Lizzeri and Persico (2004) investigate democratization
processes in Europe and argue that an increased demand for public goods, rather than
the demand for redistribution of taxes led to an increase of the franchise. Aidt, Dutta
and Loukoinova (2006) empirically examine the patterns of government spending in
England from 1830-1938 and find that spending increased mainly for security and
long-term public services, which supports Lizzeri's hypothesis. We incorporate the
evidence from Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Aidt, Dutta and Loukoinova (2006) and
model the demand for public goods, rather than the redistribution of taxes to the
poor.
The economic literature on civil conflict is summarized by Sambanis (2002) and
Blattman (2009). Factors that have been found to fuel civic conflict are low per capita
income, slow economic growth, and geographic differences.9 Sambanis criticizes the
lack of differentiation between different forms of civil violence, especially in empirical
8Moore (1967) also discusses the controversial hypothesis that revolutions can have a positive
impact on a country's democratization process. He argues that even though the poor never profited
from a revolution immediately, revolutions enabled industrialization and therefore benefited the poor
in the long run.
9See for example Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2009) and Reynal-Querol (2002).
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approaches. He argues that the sources of civil conflict determine the incentives of
the policy makers and hence, a better identification of the sources of civil violence
is crucial for the understanding of social conflict. Blattman (2009) suggests to
be cautious with the interpretation of the relationship between civil conflict and
democracy based on correlations found using the Polity IV data set (which is the
data set most empirical work is based on), because of identification problems due to
the coding of the data. lO Blattman also addresses the importance of micro-level data
in order to investigate the causes and effects of civil conflict. He notes that while
there is agreement that civil wars start only of they are economically feasible, there is
little explanation to why and how armed groups form and how they reach agreements
to end civil wars in the absence of law.
Gurses and Mason (2008) look at the outcome of civil wars. They classify three
possible outcomes. According to them, civil wars can end in rebel victory, government
victory, or some form of negotiated settlement. The important link of this study to our
model is that Gurses and Mason find that rebel victories are less likely to be associated
with democratization, on the contrary, they are likely to result in an authoritarian
regime that favors its supporters and excludes the supporters of the old regime. In our
model, we follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who model revolutions as always
successful once they are economically beneficial for the group that starts it. We
lOSee Marshall and Jaggers (2004) for the data set, Regre and Gates (2001) and Reynal-Querol
(2002) for studies using the Polity IV data and Vreeland (2008) for a critique of the data set.
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apply this concept to civil wars: If a civil war is starts, it is successful, i.e., leads to a
separation of the country, which is what Gurses and Mason call a "rebel victory". The
results obtained in this study support Gurses and Mason's finding that a successful
civil war, or a rebel victory, is unlikely to induce democratization.
Gurses and Mason (2008) as well as Besley and Persson (2009) explicitly address
repression as a form of civic violence. Since we focus on "successful civil wars", we
only implicitly take repression into account. In our model, a cost is associated with
civil war. If a political system is highly repressive, then this implies in our model that
the cost of civil war is very high.
Reynal-Querol (2002) finds that a proportional democracy has a lower probability
of a group rebellion than majoritarian system. We model a majoritarian democracy.
Extending the model to account for the differences found by Reynal-Querol (2002)
would be a valuable addition to this paper. But since this paper focuses on the
dissolution of countries, these differences are not the primary objective of this paper.
The focus of the existing literature that is concerned with the dissolution of
countries is on dissolution as a solution to civil war (Sambanis (2000), Sambanis
and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009)). Only Levy (2007) models partition and civil war as
alternatives. He focuses on the consequences of partition for the consumption growth
rates of the citizens, but does not account for the political structure of the country.
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Modeling the Dissolution of Countries
In the following, we introduce our model environment, and the structure of the
extensive form game developed to model the decision of countries to dissolve.
Our model is built on the framework developed by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006). We use the same mechanism for democratization processes, which is based
on a conflict between the poor and the elites of a country. In this framework, the
existing elites start democratization processes, i.e., strategically extend the franchise,
to prevent social unrest and revolution. A key difference between our approach
and Acemoglu's framework is that we model the citizens' demand for public goods,
not their demand for tax redistribution. Furthermore, we model a society with
heterogenous preferences over public goods, creating a tension not only between the
poor and the elites, but also between different groups of a society. The purpose of
this is to show that while the tension between the poor and the elites can induce
democratization of a country, the tension between two groups within a country can
lead to a dissolution of the country.
In this static version of the model we introduce one game that starts out in
oligarchy, and one that starts out in democracy. Analyzing the differences between
these games allows us to compare whether the dissolution of countries is more likely
in oligarchy or in democracy and why. 11
11In a dynamic version of the model, we can then combine these two games.
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Model environment
The society consists of two tribes, iE{ L, S}. Tribe L has more members than tribe
S. The members of these tribes differ according to their preferences over two public
goods land s. Both tribes value only one of the public goods, and are indifferent
about the other one. The utility of the members of tribe L increases only in public
good l, and the utility of the members of tribe S increases only in s. We assume that
the individuals' utility over the public goods follows a strictly concave function, i.e.,
that f(O) = 0, .t'(.) > 0, and j"(.) < 0.
Both tribes consist of two types of individuals: rich with fixed income y~ = y;: = y;
and the poor with income y~ = y; = y;. The size of the large tribe L is OL and the
size of the small tribe S is os, with OL > os. Both tribes consist of poor and rich
people (jE{p, r}), according to the fractions o~ and 8~, where 8~ > o~. We assure that
the median voter is a poor member of the large tribe, i.e., that at least 50 percent of
the population are poor members of the large tribe, or 0; ~ 0.5. 12 There is the same
f . f' hi' h'b' 0; o~ T . . 1ractlOn 0 nc peop e m eac tn e, l.e., XL S' 0 economize on notatlOn , tota
Up 6p
j
population is normalized to 1. Hence, L L 8; = 1. Mean income is denoted by y.
In the following, we define the indirect utility functions of the individuals, depending
on whether the country stays together or dissolves.
12This ensures that in a democracy, the median voter is a member of the large tribe.
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Public goods provision with two tribes in one country
If the country stays together, then there is a common tax rate for the members of
both tribes to finance the public goods. This is a simple way to have different groups
treated differently given the implied public good provision levels. The government
budget constraint is
j
T = 7 LL5jyj = 7Y (IV.1)
where 7 is the tax rate. A fraction a of the government revenue T is spent on public
good I, and (1 - a)T is spent on s.
We assume that the individuals have quasi-linear preferences. When the tax rate
is 7 and the fraction of the government revenue spent on public good I is a, the
indirect utility of a member of tribe L is
(1 - 7)yf + f(l(a, 7))
(1 - 7)yf + f(a7Y) (IV.2)
and the indirect utility of a member of tribe S is
(1 - 7)yf + f(s(a, 7))
(1 - 7)yf + f((l - a)7Y) (IV.3)
The indirect utility function is conditioned on the policy variables a and 7. We also
condition on yj because individuals also make economic choices depending on the
policy variables. It is straightforward to derive each individual's ideal tax rate and
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preferred allocation of government revenue from these indirect utility functions, since
they are the values for T and a that maximize v~/(y~IT, a). Under the assumptions
made about f(l) (and f(8), accordingly), Yji(yjIT, a) is strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable. The optimal tax rate can then be found simply from an
unconstrained maximization problem, so we need to set the derivative of Yji(y~IT, a)
with respect to Tequal to zero. In other words, TJ needs to satisfy the first order
conditions:
L
1'(l) = Yj-
ay
s
f '( ) Yj8 = (1 - a)17
(IVA)
(IV.S)
(IV.6)
These conditions imply that the rich always prefer a lower tax rate than the poor,
as long as they receive a positive amount of their preferred public good. From the
indirect utility functions of the two tribes we also know that for members of tribe L
a = 1 is optimal and that a = 0 is optimal for members of tribe S.
Public goods provision after the country dissolves
If the tribes split up and form two separate countries, then a is not a choice
variable, because the tribes spend all government revenue only on the public good
they receive positive utility from. Another difference is the size of the government
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revenue, which is now for each country (ic:{L, S}) given by
j
T i = TL 8;y} = 8iTY
where T is the tax rate again.
The indirect utility of a citizen of country L is
and the indirect utility of a citizen of country S is
VjS(yfIT) = (1 - T)yf + f(8(T))
(1 - T)yf + f(8sTY)
(IV.7)
(IV.8)
(IV.9)
Again, we need to set the derivative of Vji(y;IT) with respect to T equal to zero to
find the optimal tax rate.
L
1'(l) = :1y
S
1'(8) = :~y
(IV.lO)
(IV.11)
(IV.12)
As before, these conditions imply that the rich always prefer a lower tax rate than
the poor as long as they receive a positive amount of their preferred public good. The
first order condition for Sand L as two separate countries also imply that the optimal
tax rate is higher in the larger country L, since l' (l) < l' (8).
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A static model of the dissolution of countries
The timing of the basic extensive-form game between the elites and the poor of
the two tribes is depicted in the game tree in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. We compare
two scenarios; one, in which the elites initially have political power and one where the
poor have political power in the beginning of the game. This allows us to investigate
whether dissolution of countries is more likely in oligarchies or in democracies.
When the game starts in oligarchy (Figure 4.1), the large elite first decides whether
to dissolve the country or to stay with the small tribe. If the country dissolves,
then the elites of the two tribes (now countries) choose the political structure of the
countries as well as the tax rate and the allocation of the pubic goods in the countries.
In the figure, this is referred to as AgL and AgS , where "Ag" stands for Acemoglu-
game, which is a subgame modeling the decision of the elites to introduce democracy.
We refer to this part of the game as "Acemoglu-game", since this is the framework
introduced in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), with the difference that we model the
provision of public goods and not the redistribution of taxes. All the Acemoglu games
are explained in detail below. If the country stays together, then Nature moves next
and determines the cost of civil war, which can be rH or rL, where rH indicates a
high cost, and rL a low cost of civil war. With probability q, the cost of civil war
is high, and with probability 1 - q, the cost of civil war is low. We assume that rH
is high enough to prohibit civil warY Given the cost of civil war, the small elite
13This is a. simplifica.tion that has no impact on the crucial results in the static version of the
game.
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then decide whether to start a civil war or not. It is assumed that every civil war is
successful, i.e., results in a separation of the tribes into two countries. Civil war is
assumed to destroy a fraction I of the resources of both countries.
If there is a civil war, then the elites of the two tribes (now countries) choose the
political structure of the countries, the tax rate and the public good allocation, i.e.,
the small elites play the subgame Ag2. If there is no civil war, then the large elite
chooses the political structure of the country and the allocation of the public goods,
which is explained in detail as Agl.
Large Elite
DiSS~SOlve(*)
Elitei Nature
~S ~
Small Elite
N~
Agl Elitei
f\
Small Elite
NCW~
Agl EWeif\s
Figure 4.1. Game starting from oligarchy
When the game starts in democracy (Figure 4.2), the median voter, who is a
poor agent of the large tribe, first decides whether to dissolve the country or to stay
with the small tribe. If the country dissolves, then the poor of the large tribe remain
in a democracy. The political structure of the small country is uncertain, but since
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Large Poor
DiSs~solve(*)
Elite; Nature
~S ~
D D of Ag3S Small Elite
N~
D Elite;
f\
Small Elite
NCW~
D Elite;f\s
Figure 4.2. Game starting from democracy
the small elite is not involved in the first decision to dissolve or not, the political
structure of the small country after dissolution is irrelevant for the rest of the game.
If the country stays together, then Nature moves next and sets the cost of civil war
to either "fH or "fL. Given the cost of civil war, the small elite then decides whether to
start a civil war or not. If there is a civil war, then the elites of the two tribes (now
countries) choose the political structure of the countries, the tax rate and the public
good allocation, i.e., the small elites play the subgame Ag2. If there is no civil war,
then the median voter chooses the political structure of the country, which means
that the country stays democratic.
The equilibrium of both games described above can be solved using backward
induction. In the following, we find the equilibria of all subgames, then introduce
the equilibrium of each the games depicted in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, before we
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compare the equilibria of both games to determine whether dissolution is more likely,
i.e, happens for larger ranges of parameter values, in democracy or oligarchy.
Revolution constraints
We use the static game of democratization described in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) to model the decision of the elites in a country whether or not to introduce
democray. In this approach, transitory political power for the disenfranchised comes
from a revolutionary threat from the poor. The elite has no interest in redistribution of
wealth, but they prefer redistribution to revolution. If current transfers from the elite
to the poor do not ensure future transfers, but extension of suffrage changes future
political equilibria, then democratization acts as a commitment to redistribution.
Thus, political transition might be the only way to avoid revolution.
The timing of the basic extensive-form game between the elites and the citizens is
depicted in the game tree in Figure 4.3. Initially, the elites have political power and
move before the poor. They first decide whether to create a democracy or not. We
denote the tax rate set by the elites in a nondemocracy by Tr and use the notation Tp
to refer to the tax set in democracy by the median voter. If the large elites choose D,
democracy is established and the median voter sets the tax rate and a, the fraction
of government revenue that is spent on public good l. If they do not democratize,
then the tax rate and a are determined by the elite. Following these policy decisions,
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the citizens decide whether to initiate revolution. With probability 1 - p, the rich
can then reset the taxes and ex.
Rich
~
Poor
set T, a I
Poor
A
Rich can reset T, a
Rich
Iset T, a
Poor
~
V;(R,/-i) Rich
V,!(R,jl) R
V;(N) V;(f)
V/(N) V: (f)
V;(D)
V:(D)
V;(R,/-i)
V:(R,/-i)
Figure 4.3. Acemoglu's game of democratization
Two tribes in one country
As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we assume that during a revolution, the
poor take all the resources from the rich. A fraction f..l of the resources of society are
destroyed during the revolution and the remainder can be divided among the citizens.
A revolution leaves the elites with a payoff of zero. The timing of the extensive-form
game between the elites and the citizens of both tribes is as in the Acemoglu game
described above. The game tree is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Large Elite
~
Large Poor
set T, 0: I
Large Poor
~
Large Elite
Iset T, a
Large Poor
~
V/*(R, Ii)
V,L*(R, Ii)
Vps* (R, Ii)
V,s*(R, Ii)
V/*(D)
VrL*(D)
V/*(D)
V/*(D)
V/*(R, /1)
v;.L*(R'Ii)
V/*(R, Ii)
V/*(R, Ii)
Large Elite
~ Elite can reset T, 0:
V/'*(N) V/*(f)
VrL*(N) V,L*(f)
V/*(N) V/*(f)
V,s*(N) V/*(f)
Figure 4.4. Acemoglu game in one country: Agl
After a revolution, each poor agent receives a net income of
and each rich citizen receives
V/*(R, It) = 0 .
(IV.13)
(IV.14)
The notion V/*(R, {.t) denotes the value of to the citizen in a post-revolutionary society
conditional on {.t. The star indicates that this is the payoff when the country does not
dissolve. It is assumed that for a revolution to start, both the poor of the small and
the large tribe have to be made better off through a revolution. Since a is always set
by members of the large tribe, it will always be set equal to one, i.e., all government
revenue will be spent on the public good benefitting the large tribe. This implies
that the poor of the large tribe are always better off than the poor of the small tribe.
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Hence, the poor of the large tribe are always less likely to revolt, which means that
we have to compare the payoffs of the poor of the large tribe in case there is no
revolution with their payoff after a revolution to find the conditions under which a
revolution can be avoided. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) we will refer to
these conditions as the revolution constraints.
If the large elites set their preferred tax rate, then the payoff to the poor of the
large tribe is
(IV.15)
Hence, there is never a revolution if V/*(T;*) > ~L*(R, /-l), i.e., as long as
(IV.16)
If the large elites promise redistribution, i.e., set a tax rate f*, then they can reset
the tax rate with a probability (1 - p). The payoff to the poor of the large tribe is
then
(IV.17)
The promise of redistribution avoids revolution as long as ~L*(f;) > ~L*(R,/-l), i.e.,
as long as
In a democracy, the payoff of the poor of the large tribe is
(IV.19)
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and hence, democracy avoids revolution if v;,L*(D*) > v;,L*(R, /1), or,
(IV.20)
From these conditions, we know that /1; < /1; < /1i. This implies that the smaller
/1, the cost of revolution, the more pronounced is the threat of a revolution, and hence,
the more attractive is democratization as a way to avoid revolution. Proposition
8 summarizes the conditions under which revolution is avoided and the political
outcomes.
Proposition 8. If the country does not dissolve, then there is a umque subgame
perfect equilibrium {iT;, 0-;,0-;, o-;} in the game described above, (Ag1), which is such
that a = 1 and
• If /1 > /1i, the large elite set their preferred tax rate, and there is no revolution.
• If /1 < /1i
1. but /1 > /1;, then the large elite set the tax rate f* so that /1 = /1;, and
there is no revolution.
2. If /1; > /1 > /1;, then the large elite chooses democracy, and there is no
revolution.
3. it /1 < /1;, there is a revolution.
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After civil war
We assume that during a civil war, a fraction, of the resources of society are
destroyed. If a revolution happens after a civil war, an additional fraction p, of the
remaining resources is lost. After a civil war, both tribes form separate countries.
Now we have to look at the revolution constraints for both countries separately. The
timing of the extensive-form game between the elites and the citizens of both countries
is as in the Acemoglu game described above. The game tree is shown in Figure 4.5.
Poori
set T, a I
Poori
Elite i
I set T, a
Poori
~
V;(C,1,R,f.-t)
V,;(C, " R, f.-t)
V;(C,1, D)
V)(C",D)
V;(C, 1, R, f.-t) Elite;
V)(C'1,R,~Elite i can reset T, a
V;(C, 1, N) V;(C, 1, f)
V)(C, 1, N) V)(C, 1, f)
Figure 4.5. Acemoglu game in each country after a civil war: Ag2i
After a revolution, each poor agent of country i receives a net income of
V:i(C R ) = (1 - p,)(1 - ,)y!5i
P ,', ,p, ~
p
(IV.21)
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and each rich citizen receives
(IV.22)
The notion V/(C, 'Y, R, p,) denotes the value of to the citizen in post-revolutionary
country i after a civil war, conditional on p, and 'Y. (i.e., the revolution constraints).
If the elites set their preferred tax rate, then the payoff to the poor is
(IV.23)
Hence, there is never a revolution if V; (C, 'Y, N) > V; (C, 'Y, R, p), i.e., as long as
(IV.24)
If the elites promise redistribution, i.e., set a tax rate fi, then the payoff to the poor
IS
The promise of redistribution avoids revolution as long as V; (C, 'Y, fi) > V; (C, 'Y, R, p),
i.e., as long as
p, > 1- Y8i(~~- 'Y) ((1- 'Y)Y; +p(j(fiyJi) - fiy~) + (1- p)(j(T::ljJi) - T:y~)) == pf
(IV.26)
In a democracy, the payoff of the poor is
(IV.27)
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and hence, democracy avoids revolution if V;(C, ry, D) > V;(C,'Y, R, f-L), or,
(IV.28)
From these conditions, we know that f-Lr < f-Lf < f-Lf. This implies that the
smaller f-L, the cost of revolution, the more pronounced is the threat of a revolution,
and hence, the more attractive is democratization as a means to the elites to avoid
revolution.
Proposition 9 summarizes the conditions under which revolution is avoided and
the political outcomes.
Proposition 9. If the country does dissolve, then there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium {o-~, o-;,} in the game described above, (Agz) , which is such that
• If f-L > f-Lf, the elite of country i set their preferred tax rate, and there is no
revolution in country i.
• If f-L < f-Lf,
1. but f-L > f-Lf, then the elite of country i set the tax rate fi so that f-L = f-Lf,
and there is no revolution in country i.
2. If f-Lf > f-L > f-Lr, then the elite of country i chooses democracy, and there
is no revolution in country i.
3. If f-L < f-Lr, there is a revolution in country i.
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After dissolution
If a revolution happens after a the country dissolves, a fraction f-l of the resources
is destroyed. After dissolution, both tribes form separate countries. Now we have to
look at the revolution constraints for both countries separately. The game is shown
in Figure 4.6
Poori
set T, Ci I
Poori
Elitei
Iset T, Ci
V;(S, R, J-t)
V:(S, R, fl.)
V;(S, D)
V:(S, D)
v; (S, R, J-t) Elitei
V:(S, R,fJ) R Elitei can reset T, Ci
V;(S, N) V;(S, f)
V:(S, N) V:(S, f)
Figure 4.6. Acemoglu game in each country after dissolution: Ag3i
After a revolution, each poor agent of country i receives a net income of
V i(S R ) = (1 - p}yJip , , f-l Ji
p
and each rich citizen receives
(IV.29)
(IV.30)
The notion V/(S, R, f-l) denotes the value of to the citizen in post-revolutionary
country i, conditional on f-l.
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If the elites set their preferred tax rate, then the payoff to the poor is
(IV.31)
Hence, there is never a revolution if V;(S, N) > V;(S, R, /1), Le., as long as
(IV.32)
If the elites promise redistribution, Le., set a tax rate fi, then the payoff to the poor
is
(IV.33)
The promise of redistribution avoids revolution as long as V;(S, fi) > V;(S, R, /1),
i.e., as long as
(IV.34)
In a democracy, the payoff of the poor is
(IV.35)
and hence, democracy avoids revolution if V;(S, D) > V;(S, R, /1), or,
(IV.36)
From these conditions, we know that /1~ < /1~ < /1f. This implies that the smaller
/1, the cost of revolution, the more pronounced is the threat of a revolution, and hence,
the more attractive is democratization as a means to the elites to avoid revolution.
Proposition 10 summarizes the conditions under which revolution is avoided and
the political outcomes.
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Proposition 10. If the country does dissolve, then there is a unique s1tbgame perfect
equilibrium {o-~, o-;,} in the game descri,bed above, (Ag3 ), which is such that
• If /-1 > /-1f, the elite of country i set their preferred tax rate, and there 1,S no
revolution in country i,
• If /-1 < fLf
1, but /-1 > /-1~, then the elite of country i set the tax rate fi so that /-1 = /-1f,
and there is no revolution in country i,
2. If /-12 > /-1 > /-1f, then the elite of country i chooses democracy, and there is
no revolution in country i.
3. If /-1 < !I,f, there is a revolution in country i,
Comparative statics
We can now compare the equilibria of the subgames determining the political
structure of one country, two countries after civil war and two countries after dissolution,
depending on the cost of revolution. For all these subgames we found that the higher
the cost of revolution, the more "unlikely" it is that the elites introduce democracy,
in a sense that it happens for a smaller range of parameter values of /-1. We can also
compare the critical values of /-1, the cost of revolution across subgames, which shows
that /-11 > /-13 and /-12 > /-13, which implies that revolution is most likely if the country
separates. Whether revolution is more likely after a civil war or in one united country
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depends on "y, the cost of a civil war. As long as "y is large enough, revolution is most
unlikely if the country remains united. The critical value for the cost of civil war is
We assume in the following that that this is the case.
Civil war constraints
The next subgame starts with the small elite deciding whether to violently break
away from the large tribe through a civil war. A civil war can only make the small
tribe better off, because the large tribe decides about the public goods allocation and
always profits from being able to extract taxes from the members of the small tribe.
This is why the elite of the small tribe make the civil war decision.
In the following, we first examine the conditions under which the small elite does
not start a civil war, given that the game starts from a democracy. Then we examine
the "civil war conditions" for the game that starts out with an oligarchy.
Consider the game that starts out with a democracy (See Figure 4.7, a subgame of
the extensive form game depicted in Figure 4.2). The outcome after the civil war
depends on f-l, the cost of a revolution. But if there is no civil war, then the outcome
is certain: the country just remains democratic. Hence, in order to find out when the
small elites start a civil war, we have to compare the payoff they receive after a civil
war (when the small tribe forms an own country) with their payoff in a democracy,
in which they are together with the large tribe.
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Small Elite
N~
D Elite i
f\
Figure 4.7. Subgame: The small elites' decision - starting from democracy
If p, > p,f holds, Le., p, is large enough so that the small elites can set their
preferred tax rate after a civil war, then the small elites are better off without a civil
war as long as ~s*(D) > ~S(C, I, T:). This is the case as long as
(IV.37)
If p,f > p, > p,f, the small elites promise redistribution after a civil war to avoid
revolution. In this case civil war is avoided as long as ~s* (D) > ~s (C, '1 f)1or if
I > :~ (p( (1- f)yf + f( r5sfy)) + (1- p)( (1- T:)yf + f( 8ST:y)) - (1- T;*)Y:) == If
(IV.38)
If p,f > P, > p,f, then the small elites have to introduce democracy after a civil
war to avoid a revolution. In this case, there is no civil war as long as ~s*(D) >
V/(C, I, D), or if
(IV.39)
If none of the revolution constraints holds in the Acemoglu game after a civil war,
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then the small elites would never start a civil war, knowing that this would result in
a revolution.
From these conditions, we know that If < l! < If. This means that these
conditions are more restrictive the more power the small elite has after a civil war.
Civil war is more "likely", Le., happens for a larger range of parameter values, if the
small elites have more political power after the civil war. This implies that the higher
/-l, the cost of revolution, the more pronounced is the threat of a civil war.
Proposition 11 summarizes these civil war constraints.
Proposition 11. If the game starts with a democratic country, the small elites choose
to avoid a civil war
• If the small elite sets their preferred tax rate after a civil war (i. e., 11 > IIf) and
I > I~
• If /-l < /-If does not hold and
1. the promise of redistribution avoids revolution after a civil war and I > I~
2. If the elites choose to democratize after a civil war and I > I;'
3. If there would be a revolution after a civil war.
Now consider the game that starts out with an oligarchy (See Figure 4.8, a subgame
of the extensive form game depicted in Figure 4.1). Here we have to compare the
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payoff of the small elite in the case of a civil war (Ag2) with the payoff the small elite
receives in the one country case (AgI), conditional on f.L, the cost of revolution.
Small Elite
N~
Agl Elite i
f\
Figure 4.8. Subgame: The small elites' decision - starting from oligarchy
First, we define the civil war conditions for "I, given that f-L > f.Li, i.e., that the costs
of revolution are high enough to ensure that the large elite can set their preferred tax
rate if the country remains united.
If f.L > f.Li and f.L > f.Lf, i.e., f.L the small elites are better off without a civil war as
(IVAO)
If f-L > f.Li and f-Lf > f-L > f.Lf, then the small elites have to promise redistribution
after a civil war to avoid revolution. In this case civil war is avoided as long as
, > Is(P((I-f)Y~+f(5Sfy))+(1-P)((I-T:)Y~+f(5ST:Y))-(I-T::*)y:) ==,!i
Yr
(IVAI)
If f.L > f.Li and f.Lf > f.L > f.Lr, then the small elites have to introduce democracy
91
after a civil war to avoid a revolution. In this case, there is no civil war as long as
~S*(TrL*) > V/(C, "I, D), or if
"I > Y~ ((1- T;)Y~ + f(8ST;y) - (1 - T;*)Y;) == "If (IV.42)
If /1 > /1l, but none of the revolution constraints holds in the Acemoglu game
after a civil war, then the small elites would never start a civil war, knowing that this
would result in a revolution. From comparing the conditions on "I so that civil war
is avoided we know that "If < "I: < "Ii". This implies again that civil war is more
likely if the small elites have more political power after the civil war.
Proposition 12 summarizes these civil war constraints.
Proposition 12. If the game starts out of oligarchy, and /1 > J-Li, i. e., the large elites
set their preferred tax rate if the country remains united, then the small elites choose
to avoid a civil war
• If the small elites set their preferred tax rate after a civil war (i. e., /1 > fl,f) and
"I > "It
• If /1 < /1f does not hold and
1. The promise of redistribution avoids revolution after a civil war and "I > "If
2. If the elites choose to democratize after a civil war and 1 > 1f:.
3. If there would be a revolution after a civil war.
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Now we can employ the same logic to define the conditions on , that avoid civil
war for the case that f-Li > f-L > f-L;, i.e., the large elites have to promise redistribution
to avoid revolution if the country remains united. It is impossible that f-Li > f-L > f-L;
and f-L > f-Lf, because the parameter values for f-L that avoid revolution are more
restrictive after a civil war then if the country remains united.
If f-Li > f-L > f-L; and f-Lr > f-L > f-Lf, the small elites promise redistribution after a
civil war to avoid revolution. In this case civil war is avoided as long as~s*(f;) >
~S (C, " f), or if
, > Is (p((I- f)Y; + f(oSfy)) + (1 - p)((1- r;)y; + f(osr;Y)) -
Yr
p((1 - f*)y;) - (1 - p)(1 - r;*)Yn == ,t (IV.43)
If f-Li > f-L > f-L; and f-Lf > f-L > f-Lfthen the small elites have to introduce democracy
after a civil war to avoid a revolution. In this case, there is no civil war as long as
If f-Li > f-L > f-L; , but none of the revolution constraints holds in the Acemoglu
game after a civil war, then the small elite would never start a civil war, knowing
that this would result in a revolution.
From comparing the conditions on , so that civil war is avoided we know that
It < ,t· This implies again that civil war is more likely if the small elite has more
political power after the civil war.
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Proposit1;on 13 summarizes these civil war constraints.
Proposition 13. If the game starts out of oligarchy, and p,; > p, > p,;, z. e., the
large elite promises redistribution if the country remains united, then the small elite
chooses to avoid a civil war
1. The promise of redistribution avoids revolution after a civil war and, > ,;
2. If the elite chooses to democratize after a civil war and, > ,;.
3. If there would be a revolution after a civil war.
Now we need the conditions on , that avoid civil war in case that the large elites
have to introduce democracy to avoid revolution if the country remains united, i.e.,
if p,; > p, > p,~. If p,; > p, > p,~, then p,f > p, > p,f, because the conditions on p, that
avoid a revolution are more restrictive if the country stays together.
Hence, if p,; > P, > p,~ and p,f > p, > p,f, then the small elite also has to introduce
democracy after a civil war to avoid a revolution. In this case, there is no civil war
as long as V;.B*(D) > V/(C", D), or if
(IV.45)
If Jf,; > P, > p,~, but none of the revolution constraints holds in the Acemoglu game
after a civil war, then the small elite would never start a civil war, knowing that this
would result in a revolution.
Proposition 14 summarizes these civil war constraints.
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Proposition 14. If the game starts out of oligarchy, and fL~ > fL > fL;, i. e., the
large elite promises redistribution if the country remains united, then the small elite
chooses to avoid a civil war
1. If the elite chooses to democratize after a civil war and "( > /i.
2. If there would be a revolution after a civil war.
Finally we need the conditions on "( that avoid civil war for the case that fL < fLi,
i.e., the large elites cannot avoid if the country remains united. If revolution is the
sure outcome if the country stays together, then the small elites never start a civil
war, since the revolution constraint is more restrictive in after a civil war than if the
country stays united.
Proposition 15. If the game starts out in oligarchy, and fL < fL;, then the small
elites never start a civil war.
Comparative statics
From the discussion of the civil war conditions above, we know that given the
revolution constraints after a civil war (the constraints on fL in Ag2), the parameter
values of "(, the cost of civil war, are more restrictive if the small elites have more
political power after a civil war. Hence, the small elites are more "likely" to start a
civil war if they can increase their political power - and therefore their payoffs - by
doing so. This is only the case in democracies, and hence, civil war is more likely
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in democracy.14 We can also compare the civil war conditions, depending on the
revolution constraints in the united country, given the revolution constraints for the
separate countries after a civil war. This yields "It' < "It < "If for tE{I, 2, 3}. This
implies that civil war is more "likely" if the poor have more political power in the
united country.
The decision to dissolve the country under democracy
If the game starts out in a democracy (Figure 4.2), then the median voter, a poor
member of the large tribe, decides whether the two tribes stay together in one country
or if the country dissolves. If the tribes stay together, then nature moves next and
sets the cost of a civil war, 'YH or 'YL. 'YL indicates a low cost of civil war, which
happens with probability q. With probability 1 - q, the cost of civil war is high. To
keep the analysis focused on the key points, we assume that 'YH is high enough to
avoid civil war in general. This means
(IV.46)
The country will stay together if the median voter, a poor member of the large
tribe, expects a higher payoff from staying together than from dissolving. The median
voter always chooses not to dissolve if the civil war constraints do not bind. If they
bind, i.e., the small elites choose civil war if nature chooses 'YL, then median voter
decides to separate in the following three cases.
14If It> Itf, then (37) is more restrictive than (40). If Itf > It > Itf, then (38) is more restrictive
than (41) and (43) and if Itf > It > Itr, then (39) more restrictive than (42) and (44) and (45).
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If f-lf > f-l and, < ,f the median voter chooses separation of the countries if
qV/(C", N) + (1 - q)V/*(D) < ~L(S, D)
If f-lf < f-l < f-lf and, < ,f the country is separated if
(IV.47)
(IV.48)
if
If f-lf > f-l > f-lf and, < ,f the the median voter decides to dissolve the country
q~L(C",D)+ (1- q)V/*(D) < ~L(S,D) (IV.49)
These conditions imply that the more a civil war pays off for the small elite,
the more likely it is that dissolution is chosen as a measure to avoid a civil war.
Proposition 16 summarizes these civil war constraints.
Proposition 16. If the game starts out in democracy, then the median voter, a poor
member of the large tribe, chooses to dissolve the country if
1. If f-lf < f-l, , < ,f and q~L(C", N) + (1 - q)~L*(D) < ~L(S, D)
2. If f-lf < f-l < f-lf, , < ,f and q~L(C", f) + (1 - q)~L*(D) < ~L(S, D)
3. If f-lf > /J, > f-lf, , < ,f and q~L(C", D) + (1 - q)~L*(D) < ~L(S, D)
The decision to dissolve the country under oligarchy
If the game starts out in a oligarchy (Figure 4.1), then the large elites decide
whether the two tribes stay together in one country or if the country dissolves.
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The country will stay together if the large elite expects a higher payoff from
staying together than from dissolving. They always choose not to dissolve if the civil
war constraints do not bind. If they bind, i.e., the small elite chooses civil war if
nature chooses /L, then the median voter decides to separate in the following cases.
First, we define the conditions for the dissolution of the country given that p, > p,~,
i.e., that the costs of revolution are high enough to ensure that the large elites can
set their preferred tax rate if the country remains united.
If p, > p,~, p, > p,f, and / < /tt, the conditions for dissolution depend on the payoff
after dissolution, which depends on p" the cost of revolution. Hence, if p, > p,f, which
implies that the elites set their preferred tax rate if the country dissolves., then the
large elites choose to dissolve if
qV/(C, /, N) + (1 - q)V/*(N) < V/(S, N) (IV. 50)
If the elites have to promise redistribution after the country dissolves, Le., p,f > P, >
p,~, the large elite chooses dissolution if
qV/(C, /, N) + (1 - q)V/*(N) < v:,L(S, f) (IV.51)
If p,~ > p, > p,: and the elites have to introduce democracy after dissolution, then the
large elite dissolves if
(IV.52)
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These conditions imply that more power the elites have after dissolution, the more
likely they are to dissolve.
If p> p~, pf < P < pf, I < If!, and pf > P > p~, then the country dissolves if
qV/(C, I, f) + (1 - q)V/*(N) < ~L(S, f)
If p~ > P > p~, then dissolution is chosen if
q~L(C, I, f) + (1 - q)V/*(N) < ~L(S, D)
(IV.53)
(IV.54)
Again, it is the case that the more power the elites have after dissolution, the more
likely they are to dissolve.
If pf < P < pf, I < If and p~ > P > pf, then the country dissolves if
qV/(C, I, D) + (1 - q)V/*(N) < VrL(S, D) (IV.55)
Comparing the conditions above with respect to the cost of revolution after a civil
war shows that the less power the elites have after a civil war, the more likely it is
that the large elite chooses to dissolve the country.
If pf < p< pf, pf < P < pf, and I < I;' then the country dissolves if pf > P >
p~
(IV. 56)
and if p~ > P > pf, the country dissolves if
(IV.57)
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If p,f < P, < p,f, and I < It, and p,~ < P, < p,f, then the country dissolves if
If p,; > p, > p,;, p,f < p, < p,f, and I < If, then the country dissolves if
q~L(C, I, D) + (1 - q)~L*(D*) < V;(S, D)
(IV.58)
(IV 59)
The large elites never choose to dissolve the country if p, < p,f, i.e., if there would
be a revolution after dissolution.
Comparing the conditions above with respect to the cost of revolution if the
country stays united shows that the more power the elites have in a united country,
the less likely it is that the large elites choose to dissolve the country.
Comparative statics and results
We can now compare the conditions under which an oligarchy dissolves with the
ones under which a democracy dissolves to find out under which political system the
dissolution of a country is more likely.
There are three cases. First, consider the situation that a civil war is certain and
p, > p,f, i.e, the elites set their preferred tax rate after a civil war. In this case, a
democracy dissolves if (47) holds. Whether an oligarchy dissolves or not depends
on which political system is established after dissolution, which in turn depends on
p" the cost of revolution. The more political power the elites have after dissolution,
the more attractive is dissolution in oligarchy (compare (50), (51), and (52)). But
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even if the elites are able to keep their political power after dissolution, which means
that an oligarchy dissolves if (50) holds, condition (47) still is less restrictive than
condition (50), implying that if f-L > fLf, dissolution is more "likely" in a democracy,
i.e., happens for a larger range of parameter values of g, 'Y, and f-L.
If f-Lf > f-L > f-Lf and a civil war is certain, then a democracy dissolves if (48)
holds. Again, the decision of an oligarchy to dissolve depends on the cost of revolution.
Hence, we have to compare conditions (53), (54), (56), and (57) with (48) to determine
under which system dissolution is more likely, given that f-Lf > f-L > f-Lf. (56) is the
condition under which dissolution is most likely in an oligarchy. Comparing (56) with
(48) shows that again, dissolution is more likely in a democracy.
If f-Lf > f-L > f-Lf and a civil war is certain, the a democracy dissolves if (49) holds.
An oligarchy dissolves if (55), (58), or (59) hold. Again, which of these conditions
we have to compare with (49) depends on the cost of revolution. Dissolution is most
likely in case (59) holds, but again, (59) is more restrictive than (49), implying that
dissolution is more likely for democracies.
These results can be summarized as follows
Proposition 17. A democratic country is more likely to dissolve than an oligarchy.
In democracy the threat of a civil war, which is the possibility that the elites gain
political power as a result of the civil war, induces dissolution. In an oligarchy, on the
other side, the threat of a revolution is least pronounced if the country stays together,
which makes it more likely that an oligarchy is not dissolved.
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Ethiopia, for example, was an autocratic system when Eritrea first demanded
independence. The Ethiopian government chose to stay united, because the threat
of a revolution is smallest if the country stays united. Hence, potentially risking a
civil war was the lesser of two evils for the ruling elites in Ethiopia. Czechoslovakia
dissolved peacefully because in this democracy, dissolution was seen as the preferred
alternative compared to potentially facing a civil war. Even though Yugoslavia had
a similar past as Czechoslovakia, the important difference between the dissolution of
these two countries is that while Czechoslovakia consisted of two republics, Yugoslavia
included eight different territories. The gain for Serbia from keeping Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Slovenia part of a united Yugoslavia
was large enough and the payoff after dissolution small enough to deny the independence
demands of the republics.
Conclusion
The focus of this paper is to determine why some countries stay united while
other dissolve - either through civil war or peaceful partition. In order to examine
such political transition processes, it is important to understand what drives the
different forms of political violence. We argue that revolutions and civil wars happen
for different reasons and have very different effects on the political structure of a
country. A revolution, on the one hand, happens if a group of citizens revolts and
overthrows the government. Most often this is a conflict between the poor against
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the elites of a country. A "civil war", on the other hand, is more precisely defined as
a conflict between two groups of citizens.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries. We
model a society with two different groups of citizens (we call them tribes), who
have different preferences over public goods, to analyze under which political regime
the dissolution of these tribes into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating
between revolutions and civil wars allows us to look at the effects of both forms of
political violence separately. We find that while the threat of a revolution can induce
oligarchies to increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a country
to dissolve peacefully. Our model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely
in democracies, whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
The mechanism for this result is that in democracy, the threat of a civil war, which
is the possibility that the elites gain political power as a result of the civil war,
induces dissolution. In an oligarchy, on the other side, the threat of a revolution is
least pronounced if the country stays together, which makes it more likely that an
oligarchy stays united.
This model explains why the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia was possible,
because the median voter chose dissolution over civil war. In Yugoslavia, on the other
side, the median voter chose to "gamble", because the expected payoff of staying
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was larger than the payoff from separating. This model also explains why most
dissolutions after civil wars happened in countries with low democracy index. 15
The simple model developed in this paper follows the tradition of formal political
economy models; we intend to develop a systematic understanding of complex social
phenomena and abstract from much of the detail. Hence, the model is intended
to describe the broad patterns (not the details) of political decision makers' choices
about public goods allocations, taxes, and independence.
An important issue for further research is to address and model the impact of
third parties on civil conflicts. Countries not directly involved in such conflicts often
influence the outcome of civic conflicts by providing funds for one of the parties
directly involved. Modeling the incentives and the influence of third parties is crucial
for testing this model empirically.
15Sambanis (2000) states that from 14 countries that dissolved after a civil war since WW2, the
only separation of two countries with a high democracy index (which is measured using Jagger and
Gurrs Polity 98 data) are India and Kashmir.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The three chapters of this dissertation address the impact of special interest groups
on economic decision making processes.
The hypothesis of the first essay is that there exists a dynamic relationship between
politicians and lobby groups. Politicians may choose to support "projects" proposed
to them by lobbies because they yield clear economic benefits. However, governmental
support may continue after these benefits have been exhausted, implying a cost to
society and yielding rents to the lobbies. A theoretical framework is developed to
model the incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with
the hypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from
which all economic rents have been extracted, politicians are rationally reelected.
In the second chapter I examine how structural changes in the US steel industry
affect the voting behavior of House Representatives on trade related bills. The
hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC bailed
out the pension plans of major steel firms. Representatives have an incentive to
vote less for protectionist policies, because the bailout makes the steel firms more
competitive. But the Representatives also have an incentive to yield to the demands
of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The data set
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underlying this study is a panel including votes on trade related bills over 9 years.
The results obtained using fixed effects techniques support the hypothesis.
In the third chapter, I develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries.
I model a society with two different groups of citizens, who have different preferences
over public goods, to analyze under which political regime the dissolution of these
groups into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions and
civil wars allows me to look at the effects of both forms of political violence. I find
that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to increase the franchise,
the threat of a civil war can induce a country to dissolve peacefully. The model
predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies, whereas oligarchies
are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II
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Figure A1: Incumbencies of lobbies overlap
Proof 1. If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type:
Bad politicians receive E + k in period 1 if they support both lobbies. This reveals
them as bad politicians, which implies that they are not reelected and hence, do not
receive any payments in their second period. If bad politicians choose to support only
the young lobby in period 1, i. e., if they choose to pool, they receive E in period 1. In
this case, bad politicians are reelected and receive expected payments of (3E + (3(2k -
aH + a(k - aL)) in their second period. Hence, if the old lobby is a low type and the
young lobby is a high type, then bad politicians pool if
or
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If both lobbies in period 1 are low types: Bad politicians receive k + k - aL + E if they
separate and an expected payoff of E + f3E + f3(k + cx(k - aL)) if they pool with good
politicians. Hence, bad politicians pool if
or
o
Proof 2. If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high
type: The expected spillovers to the voters are x + f32x if bad politicians pool. If
bad politicians separate from good ones, the expected benefit is f32x. If both lobbies in
period 1 are low types: The expected spillovers to the voters is x if bad politicians pool.
If bad politicians separate from good ones, the expected voter benefit is IIx. Hence,
voter welfare increases if bad politicians choose to pool with good ones. o
Proof 3. Good politicians support both lobby types if the expected voter welfare from
doing that is higher than the expected voter welfare from supporting only young lobbies,
i. e., if
which can be simplified to the condition
1
->x2 -
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D
Proof 4. Bad politicians pool with good ones if the expected payments they receive from
pooling are larger than the expected payments if they separate. The expected payments
from pooling are
A nd the expected payments from separating are given by
Hence, pooling is optimal if
D
Proof 5. As long as good politicians support old lobbies, the expected payoff of high
type lobbies is positive. If good politicians do not support old lobbies, the expected
payoff of high type lobbies becomes·negative and they do not join the pool of potential
lobbies. D
Proof 6. Both pooling conditions of the baseline model are more restrictive than the
pooling conditions of the extension of the model. Three cases are possible:
(1) If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type and
12" < a ~ 1, the pooling condition of the baseline model is more restrictive if
109
which is the case since the expression above can be simplified as
aH(cr{3 - cr + 1) > k(l- cr - 4{3 - cr(3)
where the inequality has to hold because aH > k and (cr{3 - cr +1) > (1- cr - 4{3 - cr(3).
1(2) If both lobbies are low types and 2" < cr .::; 1, the pooling condition of the baseline
model is more restrictive if
1 1 1 1(- - cr)(k - aL) + k( - - 1) > (- - 2)crk + (- - 1)(1 - cr)(2k - aH) + craL{3 {3 {3 {3
This expression can be simplified as follows
The inequality holds because the left hand side of the equation is positive and the right
hand side is negative.
(3) If both lobbies are low types and cr = 1, the pooling condition of the baseline model
is more restrictive if
1 1 1(- - cr)(k - aL) + k( - - 1) > k( - - 2) + aL{3 {3 {3
which is the case since
D
Proof 7. The expected payoff to the voters is x +{3(1- cr)2x if bad politicians pool. If
bad politicians separate from good ones, the expected payoff to the 1Joters is (1- cr )2x+
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1
,8IIx + ,8(1- II)(l- o:)2x. As long as 0: < 2' without which pooling is automatic, the
expected payoff if bad politicians pool is larger than the one if bad politicians separate
from good ones. Hence, voter welfare increases if bad politicians choose to pool with
good ones. o
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1984-1989
1989-1992
1992-1993
1996-1974
1977-1981
1982
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Table B1: US Steel Trade Protection Events
Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRA's) with Japan and the EC.
Trigger Price Mechanism applied to all imports.
Antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases filed against
EC countries. Subsequently terminated for VRAs on EC imports.
AD and CVD cases filed against non-EC countries. Subsequently
terminated for comprehensive VRAs.
Comprehensive VRAs with all significant import sources.
Extension of VRAs.
AD and CVD cases filed against significant import sources after VRAs
expire. AD and CVD remedies applied to only subset of products.
1998-2000 Multiple AD and CVD cases against Japan and other Asian countries.
2002-2003 Safeguard remedies in form of tariffs placed on steel imports, excluding
FTA partners and developing countries.
Source: Blonigen et al. (2006)
Table B2: Trade related bills Congress voted on between 1998 and 2006
Year
1998
1999
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Bill
steel import ban
steel quotas
recommit tpa
(trade promotion authority, former fast track)
tpa house passage
tpa final passage
singapore fta free trade agreement)
chile fta
australia fta
morocco fta
dr-cafta implementation act
bahrain fta
oman fta
vietnam ntr
Roll Call #
532
56
447
481
370
432
436
375
413
443
616
392
519
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